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ABSTRACT 
 
The object of this thesis is to analyse the main dynamics that can arise in a 
platform market characterized by the platform competition in a two sided market 
contest. After a brief review of the literature some definitions and examples are 
provided. Then, the basic model is introduced and the equilibriums are analysed. 
The main outcome is consistent with the related literature and shows that there are 
actual differences among goods sold in single homing and multi homing A 
database has been developed to investigate the dynamic evolution of prices in 
single-homing and multi-homing. It was found that there is a difference among the 
patterns of prices of videogames in time.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently every one of us can experience the thrilling of sneaking inside a highly 
secured facility defended by several wardens trying not to be spotted. Instead, for 
the most sportive ones it is possible to shoot the final penalty kick in the final of a 
world championship, sitting in our softest armchair in the middle of our comfortable 
living room. Playing videogames each of us can experience once in a lifetime such 
emotions and decide to play it alone or sharing such experience with friends. 
 
More than 30 years have passed since the first videogame appears but it is just 
recently that given on one side the progress in computer technology (such as 
more powerful microchips, bigger storage capacity of disks etc) and on the other 
side the possibility of having more sophisticated home equipments such as big 
screens, that the videogame market become a leading one in the media industry. 
From videogames that showed a very poor graphic we passed to videogames that 
astonish for their three dimension effects. Also the audio improved massively; from 
blip sounds we passed to surround effects. Given such improvements, it is not rare 
to have real expressions of real actors scanned to give life to digital characters or 
avatars. 
 
A videogame is a game played by an electronic machine (hardware) which 
perform the instructions present in software (game) and with which a player can 
interact by using different devices. This definition tries to describe the minimal 
essence of a videogame but it is also very useful to highlight the fact that to play a 
videogame we need a system composed by hardware and software and that both 
of them are improving in time. Given the latest technological developments, 
videogames become more complex and less childish than what they use to be. 
Improvements in the technology stimulated game designers to develop more 
structured games, rich in graphic and special effects. Moreover, the developments 
in the technical quality of the videogames push to improve also the contents of 
them. At the beginning the task that was required to the player was easy and 
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repetitive, if there was a plot, it was simple and repetitive. However, as the job was 
continuing, plots started to become more complex showing a real structure. 
 
To fully appreciate the importance of videogames it is possible to have a walk 
inside a normal electronic shop to be amused by the extraordinary number of 
offers with which the videogame console is proposed. It is not the variety of 
different combinations of the same consoles that are present that starts to make 
us a little bit lost about the little peculiarities that make them different, it is also the 
presence of a lot of different accessories that immediately catch our attention. 
About videogame, we are directly in front of different shelters that amuse the 
consumer for the number and variety of videogames proposed. There are a lot of 
different genres of games that tried to fulfil all the tastes of consumers. Moreover 
for each genre there are a lot of different options. For instance, if we look carefully 
at the sport section in the same shop, we can see that almost all the professional 
sports have a videogame that represent those sports. Moreover, for the most 
popular sports there is such a broad choice of videogames that a non informed 
consumer could not distinguish the difference among them.  
 
It has to be mentioned that it is possible to play videogames by different devices: 
computers, consoles, portable consoles, etc. However, the present work will focus 
just on the market of consoles that needs to be link to a television. Such consoles 
are produced by only three firms, however videogames are sold from an incredible 
number of software house. Moreover, if we look carefully in the same shop, we 
can notice that some videogames are sold for just one console (single homing) 
while some others are sold for more than one (multi homing). The most interesting 
thing is that, in the top ten of the most sold videogame of the week, we can 
observe that some videogames are sold in single homing and some other are sold 
in multi homing and this is true for all the consoles.  
 
Starting from this observation, the author questions himself why this phenomenon 
was happening. Why some videogames are sold for only one console while some 
others are sold for more than one? Since videogames are sold from many years, 
how it is possible there are two different selling strategies coexisting at the same 
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time for videogame of success? Since there is this conduct, what are the effects of 
these different strategies in the videogame industry? 
 
Given such questions, the object of the present work is to highlight the main 
dynamics which can arise in this industry. To achieve this target, the author 
considered among all the two sided market as the one which can better represent 
the contest in object. 
 
The two sided market is a market which was analysed in the past but cyclically 
capture the attentions of economists every time there is a new case that catches 
the attention of the economists. Stimulated by the developments of the technology 
and the managerial organization of economical activities, economists developed a 
new branch of their science. The invention of railways, telephones, dating clubs, 
etc pushed the academics to explain the main dynamics that could emerge in the 
new contests 
 
To understand better the object of this work it is better to focus on the concrete 
contest that inspired it: the videogame industry. There are different ways to play 
videogame; it is possible by using a personal computer, by consoles which need to 
be linked to a television, by portable consoles, by mobiles, etc. The market of the 
consoles that need to be linked to a television was the chosen one by the author 
because the relationships between the subjects captured his attention. The market 
of videogames for personal computers and mobiles are characterised by the 
presence of so many competitors (perfect competition) producing the hardware 
and a lot of firms producing the software (again perfect competition). Whereas the 
portable console market consist mostly in just two firms producing the hardware 
sharing almost the totality of the market (duopoly) while the software is produced 
by a large number of firms.  
 
Instead, the producers of the hardware in the market for the consoles that need a 
monitor is characterised by the presence of more than two firms and, at the same 
time, they are less than the personal computer ones. In fact this market is 
characterised by the presence of three large firms producing the hardware, while 
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the software is, again, produced by a lot of different firms. Given that was 
considered very interesting to analyse the strategic interaction between these 
competitors, especially considering that this two sided market consist also of 
several software suppliers and a large pool of consumers. 
 
If an observer takes a look on the videogame industry, she will find that the main 
characteristic is the presence of few firms producing the hardware required to play. 
However, videogames are produced by these firms and also by different 
enterprises that can choose to sell their videogames just to one console, to some 
or all of them, to one console in a first moment and later to all of them. At the same 
time, to play videogames, consumers need a console and at least one videogame. 
It is possible to observe that the two goods represent a bundle since the 
possession of just one of the two elements is useless for the final user. However, it 
is possible to notice that last generations of consoles available in the market are 
able to perform different tasks in addition to playing videogame. With some of 
them it is possible to access internet, with some others it is possible to play a DVD 
or a BLU-Ray DVD, etc. The author is aware of this fact, but it is unquestionable 
that a videogame console is primary designed and bought because of the fact that 
it plays videogames. The other entire technical characteristics can increase the 
value of a console but it is very important to keep in mind that the first and most 
important duty for a videogame console is to play videogames. 
 
Because of this market structure, it is important to analyse the dynamics of this 
market. First of all, it is possible to observe that the market object of analysis is a 
two sided market. As Rochet J.C. & Tirole Jean1 show, the two sided market is a 
market where a platform intermediate between the others two parts of the market.  
 
This work tries to investigate some of the dynamics that can arise in this particular 
market condition. Chapter 1 is dedicated to the literature review where it is 
described what a two-sided market is and what are the main effects that arise. In 
this part the author will try to expose the most relevant topics that are involved in 
the analysis of a two sided markets. Even though some features will not be 
                                                 
1
 Rochet J.C. & Tirole Jean (2004) “Two-Sided Markets : An Overview”, Institut d'Economie 
Industrielle 
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analysed later on in the model, the author reported them because his intention 
was to give first a complete and wide view of the literature to help the reader to 
familiarise with the topic. For this reason it will be described the possibility to 
switch, the occurrence of wars about standards, the option to join more than one 
platform are analysed throughout the recent economics literature. In this way it will 
be easier to understand the actions that consumers and producers will make. 
 
In the second chapter the model is developed and different equilibrium are 
showed. This model will be focused on the possibility of having a two sided market 
characterised by single homing or multi homing. The main focus will be the 
possibility that a consumer has to enjoy in more than one platform, or instead if 
this is not feasible and the consumer has the constraint to join just one platform. 
The analysis will be focused on the equilibriums that will arise and on the 
differences in the utilities of the agents that are involved.  
 
Previews works, such as Armstrong (2006)2, highlighted that a two sided market is 
very different if agents single home or multi homes. This work will try to investigate 
if the same results will arise with different assumptions.  
 
The biggest difference between the present work and the one written by Armstrong 
is that in the Armstrong one the platform has got to make two participants of two 
wider cohort of consumer match each others. In this work instead, there is a 
different relationship among participant since there are no consumers trying to 
meet each others but there are consumers and producers who needs to meet. 
Moreover, if in the Armstrong model each consumer has got to match another 
consumer, in this work the consumer can buy much more than one product and 
can purchase from different sellers. 
 
Given these differences, starting from a very simple model some little changes are 
introduced to find the equilibrium that arise in a two sided market characterised by 
different characteristics. In particular the author decided to use this approach 
because the reader could become confident with the peculiarity of the model if 
                                                 
2
 Armstrong Mark (2006) “Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, RAND journal of Economics , Vol. 
37, No 3, Autumn 2006, pp 668 - 691 
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they are introduced step by step. Starting from a very simple representation, the 
reader will be aware of the monetary and the physical transactions. In each new 
stage it will be described what is the little feature that is added and what is the 
effect of this feature in the agent involved. Moreover some interesting results will 
be given by the intermediate stages that were analysed.  
 
The main difference with the precedent literature was the assumption that the 
utility of consumers was not constant. It was assumed that the utility is decreasing 
in the good that is purchased.  
 
However, although the assumption was different respect to the previous works, the 
equilibriums were consistent with the previous literature. In particular it appear that 
when a good is sold in multi-homing the agent that multi-home will be worse off 
respect to the equilibrium that arise in a single homing context. At the same time 
for the consumer who does not multi home in a multi homing context will be better 
off respect to the equilibrium that would arise in a single homing context. Also for 
the platform there are some differences, an environment characterised by multi 
homing will harm its profits respect to an environment characterised by single 
homing.   
 
In the third chapter, a database is analysed to investigate if in the real world there 
are some differences between single-homing and multi-homing goods and if this 
differences are consistent with the model that was developed in chapter 2. The 
choice of developing this dataset was due to the fact that there are actually 
videogames sold for just one console or in more than one. In this way It would 
have been possible to have confirmation from the real world that the results predict 
by the model actually occur. If instead the database does not provide the same 
results predicted by the model, it may suggest new way to investigate starting from 
the assumptions and to try to understand better the dynamics that characterise the 
market.  
 
This database was built taking the prices of different videogame of different 
consoles on a weekly base for more than one year from three different UK 
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websites that sell videogames. This choice was taken because the author wanted 
to build a database were prices of videogames were collected for a long period of 
time. Data collections from shops would be affected by inventory problems such 
as availability of the stocks etc. Instead, considering videogames sold by websites, 
it was possible to have a more homogeneous product (not affected by locations of 
shops, different opening time, etc) that could just highlight the difference 
concerning the fact that some videogames were sold in single homing while others 
in multi homing.  At the end of the present work, all the prices are represented in 
diagrams showing their evolution in the period of analysis. 
 
The most important outcome from this research was the fact that an actual 
difference in the pattern of the prices of the videogames sold in single homing and 
multi homing. In particular, it was expected that prices would decrease in time but 
the fact that the pattern could be different among this goods was not predicted. 
From the dataset it was possible to observe that the price of videogames sold in 
single-homing was decreasing in time. However, the price of videogames sold in 
multi-homing showed a deceasing pattern but different from the previous one. In 
this second case prices were decreasing in time in a pattern that was much more 
close to a cubic function. 
 
The author reported the graphs of all the prices of the videogames that were 
observed in the second appendix. However the most important results and graphs 
were presented in the third chapter too. This was done to help the reader in 
understanding the main findings. 
 
Finally, in the last chapter, the conclusions are drawn. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this first chapter there will be an attempt by the author to describe the most 
important works that have been written on the topics that are relevant to the 
present research. Among all the possible ways of developing such a chapter, the 
author has preferred to present the contents in a linear way.  
 
The exposition will start with a definition of the market that is the context in which 
the participants perform their actions; in this case the context will be a two-sided 
market.  
 
After the definition of the market, there will be descriptions of the possible events 
that can arise. For example, there will be an analysis of what happens when a 
consumer decides to choose one agent among several. Secondly,  there will be an 
analysis of what happens when a consumer switches to another agent and how 
much it will cost if the cost is high. Finally there will be a description of the possible 
case where a consumer is be served by many more than one agent (multi-
homing). 
 
By discussing the topics in this order, this chapter attempts to make reader aware 
of the context and to make it clear how each topic is related to the other topics.  
 
The author has also provided a selection of the various examples that have been 
proposed by the papers that have been consulted. They play a useful role in 
making this work more valuable to the reader. 
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Two-sided markets 
 
When we go shopping we can hardly avoid bringing our credit card; indeed it is 
quite difficult to observe someone doing such an activity without one. Moreover it 
is frequently the case that current customers have more than one. Credit cards are 
not differentiated just by the institutions which provide them; sometimes the same 
institution offers a wide range of credit and debit cards to satisfy the needs of 
buyers and of sellers. At the same time, when we use our computer we can see 
that some of the programs and hardware we are using exhibit special labels 
showing that the software and devices are fully compatible with our operating 
system. In this way we know that the products we are purchasing will work on our 
personal computer and the sellers will be able to signal the quality of their 
products, avoiding the development of market of lemons problems. 
 
At the same time, if we want to play a videogame on our videogame console, we 
need to posses not just a console but also a videogame which is especially 
designed by a software house for our device. Moreover, if we would like to play 
different videogames we probably have to buy more than one console; sometimes 
this is the only way to enjoy a broader catalogue of software.  
 
The three examples provided above show us the importance of a remarkable part 
of the present economy. Indeed in recent years economists have started to 
investigate this topic, trying to highlight the main characteristics and the dynamics 
which can arise. The name given to this literature is platform competition, and is 
focused on the characteristics of a market where two different pools of economic 
subjects can interact thanks to the services provided by a platform. To be honest 
about this, this topic has already been studied in the past.  
 
The classical example is that of a dating club (Rochet and Tirole 2004). The 
function of a dating club is to help two different cohorts of customers to meet. In 
fact, men and women have a complementary desire to meet people of the 
opposite sex. The role of the club is to help these two groups to interact and to 
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provide a service that both are willing to pay for. It could be said that since both the 
groups want to meet, they could avoid making use of the service provided by a 
club and organise themselves without a third party. However, another fact must be 
considered: organising this service is not so easy and requires a high level of 
coordination. Moreover, the club can also help in selecting the participants. For 
example, each club tries to differentiate itself to attract particular subjects (subjects 
of a particular age, with particular interests or tastes, etc.). It is for this reason that 
clubs sometimes differentiate themselves by focusing on individuals with different 
interests or by charging different prices; in different clubs the price of the same 
good can be very different. Finally, one of the two customer groups may have a 
higher willingness to meet the other group. This is the reason why it is possible to 
observe that frequently a platform charges more to one group and less to another; 
frequently, one group is even subsidised. As an example, it is common practice 
among clubs and wedding agencies to charge a high price to men while women 
receive discounts or are even allowed to join for free. 
 
This literature in a sense developed another branch which was already 
established: the switching costs literature. This field was focused on the reason 
why some subjects do not switch from one standard and continue to adopt 
solutions which do not seem optimal. The classical example is the QWERTY 
system on computer keyboards (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994). The QWERTY 
system is the standard way of organising the keys, and it is a crucial system, since 
when we learn to type we use the QWERTY system, as do typists being taught to 
type. The reason why this system arose and is still the standard one today has 
interested economists over the years. It seemed strange that a standard could 
survive so long without another one, a newer and more efficient one, being 
developed and becoming dominant. It was suggested that the main reason was 
that it was quite difficult to switch from one standard to another, since it would be 
costly. To establish a new standard would require investment in research and 
development on a new way to organise the keys, investment to produce new 
typing machines and, finally all typists, who would have to become efficient using 
the new standard. However, who should pay for these investments? If in the end 
the equilibrium would be a higher level of efficiency, who should internalise such 
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improvement? If it is not possible to internalise such gains, who should coordinate 
the subjects involved? Since another standard called Dvorak was developed, why 
did it not become the new standard? 
 
A good discussion of this topic is provided by S.J. Liebowitz and S.E. Margolis 
(1995). Against the common knowledge, in this paper the authors asserted that the 
reason why the Dvorak standard lost the battle was not because of the lack of 
coordination among consumers and producers, as was reported in most papers. 
After the Second World War an officer of the US Navy proposed another standard 
for typing machines which would, it was claimed, increase typing speed by 25%, 
and this predicted rate was actually achieved in a test run by the same individual. 
Such a huge improvement was due to the fact that the QWERTY system, it was 
thought, was developed to slow down the typist. This was done to avoid the 
possibility of the typing machine being damaged when different levers contacted 
each other. The only question to be answered was how the switch should happen.  
 
One possible solution was to retrain all typists to the new standard. In this way all 
the factories would be forced to produce only typing machines conforming to the 
new standard, since all the typists would now be trained with the Dvorak standard.  
 
Another possible way of solving the problem was to force all the factories to 
produce typing machines conforming to the Dvorak standard. In this way all the 
typists would be forced to learn how to type using the new standard, since, from 
that moment on, the only machines available would be Dvorak ones. 
 
However, Liebowitz and Margolis stated that this was a false explanation; in fact 
the QWERTY system was not designed for the purpose of slowing the typist’s 
speed. Moreover, when the same experiment, examining the supposed higher 
efficiency of the Dvorak standard, was run by other researchers, the same 
performances were not achieved. Since the efficiencies of the two standards were 
similar, why should the subjects have to pay huge investments for an uneconomic 
switch? Even thought the two standards were equal in performance, economists 
reported this case for years to show the advantages of an incumbent standard 
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over a new and supposedly better one and the difficulties that a new standard 
would face in becoming dominant. The literature refers to these problems as 
“chicken and egg” problems. 
 
A possible solution is provided by a third subject who tries to resolve this stacking 
situation. In the dating club example, the main function of the dating club is to 
coordinate the two cohorts of subjects. It is possible for men and women to go to a 
public place to meet each other. However, it is evident that if a third subject acts as 
a coordinator and avoids market failure, then this can be profitable for all. The 
dating club can start to select subjects, helping them to maximise their resources, 
such as time, money, and so on.  
 
 
Other examples where a coordinator was required 
 
This problem can also occur in the credit card market. Why should consumers 
purchase a credit card if they have to wait for the sellers to buy the machine 
terminals? However, at the same time, why should sellers buy the terminals and 
wait for customers to obtain a credit card? At this early stage it is important to note 
the role of enterprises which support different standards, such as Visa and 
MasterCard. Investments in both R&D and promotion helped establish the market. 
By subsidising both sides, by providing terminals at a cost which was less than the 
marginal cost and by providing the service to customers for a very low price, these 
enterprises made the development of this market possible. 
 
In a lot of other cases it is easy to see that a third party is required. One service 
that should be mentioned here is the service provided by the Yellow Pages. The 
main purpose of Yellow Pages is to give information on commercial activities to 
consumers. In Yellow Pages directories customers can find the telephone numbers 
of shops, and so on. All customers have to do to find a category they are 
interested in is search in the index, and they will be able to make a list of 
telephone numbers and contacts. In the case of Yellow Pages, it is also possible to 
identify a particular pricing structure. 
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As we saw earlier, a pricing structure can differentiate among the different cohorts 
of the market and can subsidise one side.  For example, we know that in some 
clubs men pay a higher price for membership than women do. As discussed 
earlier, this happens because one side is more willing to pay more to have the 
chance of choosing among a broader group of people. In the case of Yellow 
Pages, one side can even participate for free. The Yellow Pages are given to 
householders for free; the only revenue for the companies which produce them is 
revenue from the advertisements. Commercial companies are aware that every 
time a subject needs a service for the first time, it is highly probable that he or she 
will have a look at the advertisements. Now advertisements are everywhere in 
every media; they are printed in newspapers, broadcast on television, and so on. 
Since it is impossible to stare at the television and wait for the proper 
advertisement, when a customer would like to search for a commercial service, he 
or she will need a service that is precise, selective and systematic. This service is 
provided by the Yellow Pages, where the advertisements are represented in the 
simplest way. Since companies know that all customers behave in this way, they 
will do everything possible to be in this book. Therefore, the revenues coming from 
advertisements are enough to pay for all the books for householders and to make 
a profit for the third party which provides the service. 
 
Another possible example is provided by the telephone industry. As everyone 
knows, the purpose of the telephone is to connect two or more persons by 
machines which can use electricity to transmit their voices. It is necessary that the 
machines adopt the same standard for facilitating interaction and exchanging 
information. This fact is very important, since at the beginning different standards 
were available. In the USA in particular there were various different companies 
providing telephone services. Since none of them was strong enough to become 
the only player in the market and impose its standard, consumers were obliged to 
have more than one contract to be able to reach a bigger group of subjects.  
 
Since each firm needed to develop their infrastructures and the country was so 
large, clearly it was costly to maintain that structure. For this reason AT&T solved 
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this problem, and consumers, by subscribing to just one contract, were able to 
contact all other customers who purchased a telephone contract.  
 
However, it is also necessary to mention an example linked to the telephone 
industry which shows how government intervention in a market can be different in 
different contests. In fact, after a long period when AT&T was the monopolist of the 
telephone industry, the US government decided to open the market to competition. 
With different firms competing, the final result was that prices went down but 
without producing the confusion which was a feature of the first phase of the 
industry. This was due to the fact that in the meantime an international institute, 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), was created to develop the 
standard in the telecommunication sector and also to the fact that the US 
government was very keen to avoid any company foreclosing on any of its 
competitors; so all companies had to work to guarantee full compatibility. 
 
The train industry is also characterised by the elements analysed above. The train 
is a transportation machine which needs a rail road to work. Given this, it is 
important that the rail road perfectly fits the technical characteristics of the train. 
The distance between the two rails needs to be the same as the distance between 
the wheels of the train, and the materials and shape of the rails have to be strong 
enough to allow a train to use them several times. It is clear that both the train and 
the rail road have to be built to precise standards.  
 
In this industry a lot of different standards were developed for different reasons. At 
the beginning the lack of coordination meant that the railroads were built for 
specific trains with different standards.  
 
However, even when later there was an agreement on the technical specifications 
that had to be followed, different standards were in use. Sometimes this was due 
to the shape of the land the rail road had to pass over. Consider the differences 
between building a rail road in a flat area and in a mountain area. In a flat area it is 
possible to build long curves where big trains could turn at high speed. The same 
is not possible if the rail road has to be built in a mountain area; here the train 
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would have to make very short turns at lower speed, and for this reason a short 
distance between the rails would be required. It is possible to see that, for this 
reason, in some countries different standards are required and can exist at the 
same time. 
 
A third reason why different systems are not compatible relates to politics. As an 
example it is possible to cite the fact that the Russian rail road was intentionally 
built with different technical parameters from rail roads in other European 
countries. This was done so that, in the event of an invasion, the army of the 
invading country could not make use of the infrastructures built by the Russians.  
 
 
Switching costs 
 
After considering the main characteristics and the dynamics which arise in a two-
sided market it is possible to highlight one of the most interesting aspects. Since a 
two-sided market is a market where demand and supply meet given the presence 
of an intermediary, it is also possible for another intermediary to do the same work 
and take the place of the incumbent.  
 
This idea, and particularly its strategic implications in different contests, has been 
analysed by economists. In fact, it is possible to find different results starting from 
different starting points.  
 
If there is a cost for a consumer to switch from the seller this may push the seller 
to price its goods at a very low price to build an installed base which can be 
exploited later at a higher price. Since there are switching costs it would be very 
difficult for a new competitor to enter the market and so the incumbent would have 
a strategic interest in building a big installed base at an early stage. Usually in a 
market there are subjects who are interested in a product and subjects who are 
not interested at all. However, the ones who are interested are not characterised 
by the same willingness to pay. The main objective of an incumbent is to attract 
most of the interested customers in the first perio
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exploit them later. This might be seen as the typical behaviour of the “top dog”. If a 
new firm enters this market, it will have to face competition from the incumbent for 
new customers entering the market. If the incumbent has an installed base, this 
installed base can be large enough to make the entrance of a competitor 
uneconomic, even in the case that this competitor succeeds in attracting all the 
new customers.  
 
However, there is another kind of strategic behaviour. The incumbent prefers to 
price its goods at a high price, avoiding building an installed base to exploit later. 
This is consistent with “lean and hungry” behaviour. In this case the incumbent will 
start to price aggressively when a competitor enters its market. 
 
The importance of switching costs has been highlighted in different works. 
Greenstein (1993) wrote a remarkable paper that analysed the market of a part of 
the information technology sector, the commission of computers for the US 
Federal Agencies during the 1970s. His work is very interesting because it shows 
the advantage that the first firm which enters a market has. The paper shows that 
very frequently the firm which is first to serve in a market will continue to do so in 
the following years. This is particularly evident in this market because this effect is 
very strong.  
 
Producing goods for a big agency with a very specific need may help the 
incumbent to better understand the needs of its client and to set up a better 
product each time. Also, in the extreme case where learning-by-doing externalities 
are not involved, it is clear that the specialisation of the incumbent will make it 
difficult for a competitor to enter the market. Finally, it is also important to consider 
the fact that it is difficult for a big customer with very specific needs to change its 
supplier. Also, if the supplier charges a high price, the buyer knows that the good 
fits its requirement. For this reason, a change of supplier may not be convenient 
because the new supplier’s product may not be the optimal product for the 
customer's needs. 
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For a firm, it is important to have an installed base because it is possible to exploit 
this base in the future. However, the entrance of new aggressive competitors 
aiming to attract new consumers, leaving the old ones to the incumbent, may 
produce an apparent paradox: the position of the incumbent and the entrant can 
swap over. This effect was analysed by Farrel and Shapiro (1988). and was very 
interestingly, they showed how the entrant can increase its market share to the 
point where it equals the incumbent one. At this point the previous incumbent 
should stop pricing at a high level and sell at a low price to increase its market 
share again. The final result is that the incumbent and entrant will cyclically 
alternate in the market. 
 
When switching costs are not endogenous in a market, firms will try to introduce 
them to relax the competition. The perfect example is provided by the frequent 
flyer programmes, which almost all airlines promote. Here, consumers are pushed 
to use the same company to accumulate points and win flights. If a customer 
switches firms, he or she will lose all accumulated points and will have to start 
again to collect points with the new company, if he or she wants to take advantage 
of the offer. It is clear that the biggest firms have the advantage since they have 
many more connections. It is also important to consider that if a firm has the 
monopoly over some routes, it can use this fact as a strategic tool to push 
customers to continue to use its aeroplanes for connecting flights where there is 
competition. 
 
 
Strategies to react against switching costs 
 
The previous part discussed the way companies, because they are interested in 
keeping their installed base, have developed promotions like the frequent flyer 
programmes. In a certain way, it is possible to consider these actions as a defence 
strategy against the risk that customers will switch to other competitors.   
 
The following section will analyse the strategies an entrant firm can adopt to steal 
consumers from the incumbent firm.  
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First of all, it should be remembered that switching costs are costs a consumer 
has to pay to switch from one supplier to another. Since this cost can be 
evaluated, it is possible for a firm to discount the good by the same amount of 
money the consumer pays for switching. The customer would therefore be 
indifferent between purchasing the goods from the different suppliers, and the 
strategic position of the incumbent would not be maintained. 
 
A less extreme version of this strategy could be used by a new company to steal 
some of the customers of the incumbent. If a firm has perfect information of the 
market, it is possible to imagine that the firm could price its good below the good of 
the incumbent; however, it would need to discount its good only by an amount 
equal to the switching cost the consumer has to pay. 
 
This strategy can become a predatory pricing strategy. Predatory pricing refers to 
the action of selling below the marginal cost of the good. Selling at a price lower 
than the marginal cost implies that the price is even lower than the price of perfect 
competition. This means that the firm which practises predatory pricing will incur 
losses until it stops charging such low prices. The main insight is that by taking a 
long-period perspective, the firm which practises predatory pricing will be able to 
serve all the customers in the market and push out all the rivals. In this way it will 
be possible for the firm to become the monopolist and charge higher prices and 
gain higher profits than before. 
 
Sometimes a firm will prefer to continue to price its good at the equilibrium price of 
the market and directly pay the switching costs. In this way it becomes possible to 
increase the installed base in a more direct way and try to reduce the gap between 
the firm and its competitors. 
 
This possibility was analysed by Chen (1997), and this work is crucial, since it 
shows what can happen if customers are paid to switch. In his paper Chen 
described the differences between a situation where it is possible to pay 
consumers to switch and a situation where this is not allowed. Interestingly the 
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work starts with a discussion of second period equilibrium. This is done because, 
the paper argues, second period consumers are influenced by first period choices. 
Since consumers are aware that in the second period they will be affected by first 
period choices, in the first period they will act strategically to maximise their 
welfare in both periods. 
 
The results of the paper are quite interesting and original since they demystify 
some of the conclusions of other papers. 
 
For example, considering the second period contest where paying consumers to 
switch is possible, the paper comes to some interesting conclusions. First of all, 
the market size of a firm does not have an effect on the price structure, and one-
third of the population will switch seller. Conclusions consistent with the previous 
literature are found too: when the switching cost approaches zero, the price tends 
to the marginal cost (as in the perfect competition contest). Conversely, when the 
switching cost rises, the price for all the customers rises too. However, the 
switching cost is assumed to be a dead weight loss for society welfare.  
 
When paying customers to switch is not allowed, the role of the market share is 
important. In this contest profits are maximised when the firms each supply half of 
the market and they are minimised when one firm has the totality of the market. 
The analysis of this contest shows that profits are higher when it is not possible to 
pay consumers to switch and that the dead weight loss for society is lower too. 
 
As discussed before, in the first period contest, firms and consumers make 
strategic choices. When it is possible to pay consumers to switch, firms have to be 
aware of the fact that prices are the same for firms in the second period, given that 
the equilibrium price in the first period is below the marginal cost and it is shown 
that equilibriums are unique. It is also claimed that when switching costs increase 
both profits and consumer's surpluses decrease.  
 
When analysing the situation where it is not possible to pay consumers to switch, it 
is very important to know the market share of the firms. After various calculations 
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the writer arrives at the unique solution of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 
As discussed before the market share is important and the price strategy will 
depend on it; it is also possible that first period prices will be lower than the ones in 
the other scenario. The main reason is that in this case it is possible to exploit the 
installed base in the second period. Regarding the social implications, it is certain 
that firms will earn much higher profits, while the consequences for consumers are 
debatable. It is possible that consumers enjoy lower dead weight losses (when it is 
not possible to subsidise switching) or an increase in competition (in the other 
contest). 
 
Some of these results are consistent with the work of Caminal and Matutes (1990): 
price discrimination can make firms worse off, and there will be the negative effect 
of dead weight losses due to transportation costs and switching costs. However 
there are some differences too: in Chen's model prices increase over time, and the 
role of the market share is not important in the contest where it is possible to pay 
consumers to switch. 
 
To sum up, this paper showed the different strategies a firm can choose to 
increase its profits: exploit the installed base with high prices or attract new 
customers with low prices to exploit them later. However, given the assumptions, 
the author is aware of the difficulties in assessing the welfare implications. If it is 
possible to state that in this model firms are always better off when it is not 
possible to subsidise the customer who wants to switch, it is not so clear that the 
consumer is always better off. Sometimes customers would benefit more from the 
increase in market competition, and sometimes they would benefit more from the 
absence of dead weight losses. 
 
All these cases show how long the list of options is for a firm wanting to steal 
consumers from the incumbent firm. It is also worth noting that sometimes it can 
be profitable for a firm to have a competitor in the market to increase its profits.  
 
This is true in Chen (1997), as was reported discussed before. However, 
Economides (1995) arrived at almost the same conclusion: for a monopolist 
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sometimes it is better to have another firm in the market. Moreover, if another firm 
is not present, the monopolist can find it convenient to sponsor a competitor to 
enter the market. Economides came to this conclusion because he focused on 
network externalities. For a monopolist it is very difficult to be credible when 
promising to increase production and reduce costs in the future. The presence of a 
competitor in the market can persuade consumers to trust the monopolist, since if 
it does not keep its promises customers will be able to switch to the competitor. 
 
 
Standards Wars 
 
The term “battle of standards” is usually used by economists to refer to a situation 
where two different systems enter into conflict. The first part of this chapter 
discussed one example of this conflict, the attempt made to replace the QWERTY 
typing system with the Dvorak standard. 
 
Another important case which captured much attention was the war between the 
two different standards for the home video tape industry. This battle took place 
during the 1970s, and the players were the BETAMAX format and the VHS format. 
These two formats were competing for the same market at the same time, and 
there was a lot of uncertainty over which one would win in the end.   
 
Each of them had pros and cons. BETAMAX tapes were smaller, meaning that 
they were very easy to carry. However, there was the drawback that to start with 
one tape was not enough to hold one movie, and so it was necessary to have two 
tapes for each film. VHS tapes were large enough to hold a movie but they were 
much bigger than the rival ones. Quite soon new developments in technology 
allowed BETAMAX to market a second generation of tapes that were able to hold 
a full movie. However, the VHS standard made similar improvements. Since VHS 
tapes were already able to hold a full movie, the technological progress made 
meant that definition could be increased, so increasing the tapes’ quality. 
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Given that VHS was able to present the market with a better product, the battle 
was won by the VHS standard and BETAMAX became one of the standards that, 
like Dvorak, never became universal.  
 
The case of the QWERTY standard has also been analysed by Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1995). The two authors first focused on the importance of the case. It 
was long time before the public became interested in the battle of standards. The 
amounts of investments in technology, in marketing and in promotion were 
remarkable. Moreover, many important firms took part in this war, supporting one 
of the two standards.  
 
It is also remarkable that when VHS won the war, suddenly a lot of analysts 
started to suggest that the war had been won by an inferior standard. However, 
Liebowitz and Margolis in their 1995 paper rejected all these analyses and showed 
that VHS finally won the battle because of its higher quality.  
 
 
Cooperation 
 
This last part will show how a standard can be established without the need for a 
war.  
 
The first example is provided by the DVD industry. After the VHS format came to 
rule the videotape industry, technological progress started to make tapes old. First 
of all it should be mentioned that the music sector by the beginning of the 1980s 
had been revolutionised by the appearance of a new format: the CD. The advent 
of the compact disc started the revolution of the digitalisation of the media industry. 
Since the data was recorded with a digital technique instead of an analogue one, it 
was possible to achieve a higher level of definition and a longer physical life, and 
to make cost savings, since it was much easier to make cheaper and high quality 
copies. Secondly the diffusion of personal computers powerful enough to play 
multimedia content resulted in the creation of a lot of different digital formats to 
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play this content. Given this, consumers were expecting the video industry to 
move into the new digital era. 
 
Media firms too were willing to skip to the new digital devices, but firms were 
scared that by proposing different formats they would again start a battle of 
standards. Since they were aware of the possibility that their investment would 
involve large sunk costs that probably would never be recovered, multimedia firms 
preferred to start a common project and to avoid any conflict. At the end of this 
process, the DVD (digital versatile disc) format was established. The DVD could 
store an entire movie recorded in high quality with high definition sound, and has 
enough additional space for different languages or extra bonuses such as behind-
the-scenes features, making-offs, and so on. 
 
If this development showed that collaboration can be worthwhile and can be a way 
to avoid useless sunk costs, it has to be reported that such agreement was not a 
mark of the development of the second generation of DVD. When it was clear that 
the industry was ready to move on to the next level, firms divided themselves into 
two groups focusing on different formats: DVD+ and the Blue-ray disc. The first 
format was the natural evolution of the preceding standard, in the sense that the 
same technologies were used but were improved by the latest developments in 
the field. The Blue-ray format, on the other hand, was a revolutionary one, in the 
sense that it used new devices such as a new type of laser, new codecs, and so 
on. Since DVD+ had the advantage of being fully compatible with the preceding 
generation, DVD+ machines and discs were quite cheap, and machines and discs 
of this standard were the first ones to appear in the market. The Blue-ray DVD, in 
contrast, was not compatible with existing technologies and so significant 
investments had to be made by the firms supporting this format. Moreover it 
should be considered that machines were needed in the market that could support 
the old DVD format, since consumers wanted to be able to play their old DVDs. 
Machines supporting two different standards were much more costly since they 
had to contain two different systems.  
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All in all, the case of the development of the different DVD formats showed that it 
is possible for different firms to work together on a project to achieve a result that 
benefits all involved. However it is not guaranteed that such a spirit of cooperation 
will persist in the future, as the preceding example showed. This topic was 
analysed using different examples by Varian and Shapiro (1999). In this paper 
these standards wars are analysed in all their possible forms. In fact, in the 
economic history of the battle of standards, there have been not just battles or 
peace, but also truces and unexpected events that have served to resolve the fight 
in an unexpected way.  
 
 
Multi-homing 
 
The preceding sections described what can happen when a standard has to be 
chosen. Firms can agree to support a common standard or there can be a war, 
with the winner taking all the market. However, there is a third possibility. In the 
same market there can be more than one standard, and consumers can access 
more than one standard at the same time. This is made possible by multi-homing.  
 
Multi-homing refers to the possibility of supporting more than one standard. This 
possibility can be realised in different ways. One way is the production of 
machines able to support more than one standard. An example is the Blue-ray 
DVD players, which are also able to support the preceding DVD format and audio 
CDs, as was reported above.  
 
Multi-homing is not just enabled by producers; customers can also play a part, 
since they have the option of purchasing different machines to support different 
standards. It can be hard to imagine why a person would buy more than one tool 
to do the same thing. 
 
This problem was analysed in different papers; for example Rochet and Tirole 
(2000) analysed the credit card market. In this market there are many more than 
one firm selling credit cards services. However, it is important to note that 
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consumers usually have more than one credit card. The work of Rochet and Tirole 
tried to describe the different equilibriums that can arise in this case and what 
happens when consumers or service providers are in the stronger position. 
 
Another market that has these features is the videogame industry. Videogame 
consoles were sold from the beginning of the 1980s. Since then different 
generations of consoles have been sold and it has to be said that in each 
generation there have been many more than one console for consumers to 
choose from. It is interesting to note that players with a high enthusiasm for 
gaming decided to multi-home to increase their gaming possibilities. The problem 
was that sometimes videogames were produced for different systems, but other 
times videogames were sold for just one console. If consumers wanted to play all 
the videogames in the market they had to buy more than one console, and by 
multi-homing they were able to maximise their utility. 
 
This topic was analysed by Roson (2005). In his paper the author analysed the 
characteristics of multi-homing and the various ways it can be achieved. One of 
the most significant results related to the cost of switching and the effect on the 
conduct of the market. If other authors showed that the presence of switching 
costs relaxed competition, Roson showed that the degree of competition is 
different depending on whether the consumer or the producer multi-home. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse such dynamics in a two-sided market and their 
effects on the conduct of the industry. 
 
Armstrong (2006) analysed the competition in two-sided markets, considering the 
main differences between a single-homing equilibrium and a multi-homing 
equilibrium. In his paper he describes first a two-sided market with just one 
platform and two groups of consumers. In this contest the prices that maximise 
profits for the platform are given by the cost of providing the service minus the 
benefits that the consumers get by interacting with the other group plus a factor 
that indicates the elasticity of the group’s participation. This first stage of the model 
highlights the possibility of having subsidies among a group of consumers.   
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In the following sections of the paper the author analyses the equilibrium that 
arises when there are two platforms in a single-homing contest. The main 
difference from a standard Hotelling model is the presence of a term that 
measures the opportunity cost for the platform to increase the price to one group, 
causing a participant of that group to leave. Given the equilibrium of the model, it 
is demonstrated that if there are differences among the two groups that are 
interacting, the side of greater importance for the platform will be the side where 
there is more competition and that has more benefits to the other group. One 
interesting difference from the monopolistic contest is that if a consumer does not 
join one platform, he or she will join the opposite one. However, this choice will 
also affect the decision of consumers in the other group to join the platform. With 
respect to the monopoly case, the external benefit of one group will be of more 
significance to the platform after the price has been set for the other group. 
 
The multi-homing stage is analysed only when a single group of customers joins 
both platforms. The possibility of both groups of consumers multi-homing is not 
studied because this development would involve a redundancy, since both sides of 
the market would have to join both platforms. Since just one group of consumers 
multi-homes, this means that this group is characterised by a high willingness. 
Since the group that multi-homes has these characteristics, the surplus of the 
consumers of this group will be exploited by the platforms and the other group of 
consumers.  
 
If one group in the market multi-homes, the role of intra-group externalities is 
crucial. In fact intra-group externalities can lead to consumers who multi-home 
being affected negatively by other multi-homing consumers. In this case it is 
possible to observe a market failure, since this situation means that among the 
participants of the multi-homing group are some participants who negatively affect 
their utility. 
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The videogame market 
 
The videogame market is part of the broader culture industry market.3 As 
mentioned in the introduction, the focus of this market is on videogames sold for 
consoles that need to be linked to a screen. The good which is purchased by 
consumers consists of a bundle of hardware, in this case the console, and 
software (at least one videogame). It is possible to describe these two elements 
(hardware and software) separately to gain a better understanding of the dynamics 
of this market. 
 
To start with, it can be considered that this market is quite recent and is 
characterised by a rapid evolution in different generations. Starting with the Atari 
videogame “Pong”, sold from 1975 (Dietl and Royer 2003), different firms have 
proposed consoles to play videogames. The different consoles are usually 
classified as belonging to different generations based on their characteristics, such 
as processor speed, quality of the video, quality of the audio, and so on. These 
generations are quite close to each other, each generation having lasted less than 
eight years.4  Each generation also tended to last longer than the previous one.  
 
The hardware side of the industry can be characterised as an oligopoly. Since the 
8-bit generation, the market has been characterised by the presence of two or 
three major firms. This characteristic of the market derives from the high 
investment costs required to design, manufacture and produce each console. 
Such costs are so significant that they can be considered as a barrier to entry, and 
only a few firms can survive in this market.5 Moreover, when the 32-bit generation 
started, there were eight different formats that were not compatible with each 
                                                 
3
  In 2002 the total industry sales amounted to about US $10 billion (Dietl and Royer 2003). 
4
 Analysing the market, it can be noted that the first 8-bit console was the Nintendo NES in 1986. In 1990 
Sega lunched the Mega Drive, a 16-bit console. In 1994 there was the launch of the Atari Jaguar and the 
3DO, characterised by 32-bit technology. In 1999 Sega put the Saturn console (128-bit technology) on the 
market. Finally,  in the most recent generation of consoles, Microsoft launched the Xbox 360 in 2005.  
5
 When Microsoft entered this market in 2003, the cost to enter the market was US $500 million (Dietl and 
Royer 2003: 161). 
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other; however, after two years, just three firms ( Nintendo, Sega and Sony) 
survived.6  
 
The software side of this industry is characterised by two kinds of products. 
Videogames can be produced by console producers or by independent firms. 
Given the high number of firms, their size and the high frequency with which firms 
alternate as market leaders, Peltoniemi (2008) states that the videogame software 
market is far from mature. By comparing the Herfindahl index of the videogame 
market and the index of the car market, Peltoniemi (2008) arrived at the 
conclusion that the videogame market is not mature and that a consolidation in 
market shares among the software houses is some time away. 
 
At the same time Nieborg (2011) highlights the fact that the costs involved in 
developing videogames are increasing, and now huge investments are required to 
produce a blockbuster title. For example, to develop a successful videogame such 
as “Grand Theft Auto IV”, the software house Rockstar North invested a hundred 
million dollars, while to develop the videogame “Halo 3”, Microsoft had to invest 
thirty million dollars.  
 
It can be noted that videogames are sold both for just one console and for more 
than one: respectively single-homing and multi-homing. The decision of whether to 
develop a videogame for just one console is informed by different circumstances. 
 
First of all, some videogames are produced by the same firm that produces the 
console; for this reason these games are called in-house videogames. In-house 
videogames are usually developed at the beginning of the lifecycle of a console to 
build an installed base of consumers. This installed base is necessary to push 
other independent firms to enter the market and solve the “chicken and egg 
problem” that usually arises in these kinds of markets. 
 
                                                 
6
 From 1994 onwards different consoles and console upgrades were sold. The upgrades of previous 16-bit 
consoles where produced by Sega; they were the 32CD and the 32X, and they were not successful. Totally 
new consoles were the Panasonic 3DO, Atari Jaguar, Philips CD-I, Sony PlayStation, Sega Saturn and 
Nintendo N64. Only the last three were still on the market in 1996. 
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Videogames can also be produced by independent firms. Independent firms 
endeavour to produce videogames, but they have some constraints. First of all 
some agreements with console manufacturers don’t allow producers to develop 
games for other consoles. Secondly, producing a videogame can be quite a 
complex process; for this reason software houses use particular tools called game 
engines to avoid programming a videogame from the beginning.7 If the engine is 
not compatible with different systems, producing a videogame for more than one 
console necessitates that the programming work starts from the beginning, and 
this can be particularly costly. 
 
Dietl and Royer (2003) describe the decision that firms have to make when 
choosing the system(s) on which the videogame will be played. Whether a firm 
decides to produce a videogame for just one console or more than one console 
depends on the agreements between the console producer and the software 
house and on costs. Regarding the agreements, it is important to emphasise that 
among the present generation of consoles there are two different strategies. 
Nintendo opted for a very strict policy: it tends to produce several videogames for 
its own console and generally does not allow other software houses to sell the 
videogames to other systems. Sony and Microsoft, meanwhile, do not develop 
many videogames in-house and prefer to give much more freedom to the software 
houses. 
 
Nintendo opted for this strict policy to solve the chicken and egg problem. The 
other platforms, in contrast, preferred to increase intra-system competition to 
increase the total value of the system in respect to other systems. This strategy 
was also adopted owing to the installed base of consumers. Sony and Microsoft 
aim to have an installed base and to lock as many mature consumers as possible. 
Nintendo focuses instead on 6- to 15-year-old boys; since the turnover is much 
faster and there is no lock-in effect to exploit, the strategy must be different. 
 
                                                 
7
 A videogame has to simulate a world with physics laws, but software already exists containing these laws 
and artificial intelligence. So software houses do not have to start from the beginning every time, and they 
can focus on other parts of the game such as design, plot, etc. 
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Finally, it should be remarked that profits can arise from the hardware side, the 
software side or both. It is important to remark that in this industry revenue comes 
from software royalties. Consoles are usually sold at a very low price compared 
with the industrial costs, and in the early stages of their life-cycle they are sold at a 
loss price to build an installed base of consumers. Profits from the hardware side 
are possible only in the last part of the life-cycle of a console. In this moment 
investments are recovered and the relatively high cost of a console is 
compensated by a broad catalogue of videogames which increases the willingness 
to pay of potential customers.8 
 
Since profits come from the software side, platform producers are keen to have as 
many titles as possible for their system; at the same time, they need some 
videogames that differentiate their system form the others. Software houses want 
to sell the highest possible number of each videogame, and selling the game on 
more than one console can help. However, to release a videogame on more than 
one console is costly, and for this reason not all videogames developed by 
independent software houses are sold for more than one console. 
 
The above discussion illustrates why some videogames are sold for just one 
console while others are sold for more than one.   
 
 
Possible extensions 
 
The cited works were analysed to build a consistent literature of the main 
dynamics that arise when there are different agents facing two-sided markets. 
Among all the papers cited, the work that was considered crucial by the author 
was the one written by Armstrong (2006).. The model presented in the next 
chapter is strongly influenced by Armstrong in intuition and approach. However 
there are some significant differences. 
 
                                                 
8
 It is worth remarking that just one console, the 3DO, has tried a different strategy. In 1994 this 
console was sold at a high price and revenues were expected from the hardware side. However 
this strategy was a fiasco and since then no firms have ever tried it again. 
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In the Armstrong model the two sides of the market are in a symmetric position. 
The role of the platform is to allow consumers in the two groups to meet and earn 
profits from this intermediation. However, if the two groups are characterised by 
different utilities, it is possible that the platform will charge more to the group with 
the higher utility to subsidise the second group of consumers. 
 
However, what would happen if the platform did not help the two groups of 
consumers to interact but instead made a group of firms interact with consumers? 
Moreover, what would happen if the group of consumers were characterised by 
decreasing utility? 
 
The model that is developed in the next section will try to investigate these 
questions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The development of the model 
 
The proposed model is intended to investigate a market where a platform is at the 
centre of an interaction between a group of consumers and different firms. 
However, there are some particular features that differentiate it from the models 
that were analysed in the first chapter. A discussion of the videogame industry will 
help develop a clearer picture of the model.  
 
In this industry there are consumers aiming to use a good that comes in a bundle: 
one console and, at least, one videogame. Since it is impossible to play a 
videogame without a console, it is compulsory for a consumer to purchase 
hardware that allows her to play videogames. At the same time, videogame 
producers have to develop their software for a specific platform. Since both sides 
of the market are aiming to interact, the platform will be able to profit from both 
sides in a symmetric or asymmetric way, as described by Armstrong (2006).  
 
Drawing on Armstrong’s discussion, this work will focus on the same kind of 
market, where there are asymmetries among agents. In Armstrong a platform is 
used to link two different pools of consumers. In this dissertation, however, the two 
sides are differentiated because on one side there are consumers and on the 
other side there are firms willing to sell them goods that are a part of a bigger 
system.  
 
In this market consoles are initially treated as a homogeneous good. This 
assumption is justified because, as can be seen by looking at the market, it is 
possible to play some videogames in more than one console. However, as the 
next stages are developed, a differentiation between the different platforms will be 
considered, and for this reason an element of differentiation will be included to 
analyse the possible effects. 
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The previous chapter described the main characteristics of videogames as a good. 
However, now a more detailed discussion is required to explain the possible 
dynamics that can arise in this market. First of all, it can be noted that console 
manufacturers sell videogames subject to copyright in two different ways: they 
either produce videogames by themselves or they let other firms produce the 
software for their machines. It is important to report that in the real world both 
these strategies are adopted at the same time. For all the consoles in the market 
there are videogames sold for one console and videogames sold for more than 
one. A good representation of the pros and cons of selling the product to just one 
seller or to more than one is provided by Marvel (1982), Rasmusen, Ramseyer, & 
Wile (1991), Douglas & Whinston (1998) and Dietl and Royer (2003). All these 
papers analyse the possibility for firms to have exclusive dealings with other but 
there are some peculiarities that require a further investigations. 
 
Some videogames are developed by the producers of the console on which the 
games are played. This strategy in this contest is not chosen because of the usual 
advantages associated with vertical integration of production, such as avoiding 
double marginalisation, exploiting profits in the downstream market, and so on. 
This strategy is chosen because, especially when a new console enters the 
market, the manufacturer has to persuade consumers to purchase the console. 
Since a console has utility only when it is used together with at least one 
videogame, console producers have an incentive to provide different videogames 
to attract consumers and to lock them in to their system.  
 
This strategy is the best strategy to solve the indirect holdup problem: the 
unwillingness of software producers to invest in a specific console because they 
are not sure what the reactions of the other participants in the market will be. As a 
matter of fact, all consoles in the market have at least one videogame produced by 
the console manufacturer. However, it is important to highlight that in no case are 
all the videogames for a console produced by the console manufacturer. Farrell 
and Gallini (1988) discuss this situation, showing that a firm selling a long-lasting 
hardware will not be credible when promising to continue to provide short-lived 
software. The console producer will have an obvious incentive not to support the 
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software once the customer is locked in, so, clearly, totally adopting this strategy 
would not be optimal. 
 
There is another possible strategy that console producers can adopt. They can 
allow software firms to produce videogames for their machine. In the real market, 
console producers sign agreements with third parties to develop videogames for 
their platform. These agreements can take a range of forms. They can be quite 
restrictive (the videogame cannot be sold for other consoles) or not restrictive 
(videogames can also be developed for other platforms), and they can refer to a 
single videogame or can explicitly refer to potential future editions, and so on.  
 
What is important to note is that producers will increase the competition in the 
software market by having different software. This is important for two reasons. 
First, an increase in competition means that monopolistic pricing for consumers 
who are locked in will not be possible. Second, if the competition among software 
houses increases, consumers will be able to choose among a broader pool of 
firms willing to gain profits just from the software side. 
 
There are different generations of consoles in the market. It can be noted that the 
interval among generations is increasing (Dietl & Royer 2003). However, the focus 
of this work is on the main dynamics that emerge in a single generation. Different 
papers such as Fudenberg & Tirole (1998 ) and  Ellison and Drew Fudenberg 
(2000) analyzed the problem of different generation of products in a dynamics 
contest and especially they focus on the possibility to use different generations of 
products and the use of upgrades to force the early consumers to upgrade their 
product or to buy a new version of the one they already have. However, this work 
is focused just on a single period and possible strategic choices that console 
producers can play to increase their profits focusing on more than one generation 
are not studied here. 
 
At this point it is introduced a two-sided market. In this setting there are three 
agents: platform suppliers, software suppliers and consumers. 
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To begin with, we can analyse the utility functions that are going to be applied. 
Given that the context is a two-sided market, there are at least three kinds of 
agents: 
 
S: the software suppliers  
P: the platform producers 
C: the consumers 
 
The interactions among the agents are shown in the figure below. The dashed line 
represents monetary interactions and the solid one represents material 
interactions. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Fig 2.1, S represents the software suppliers, P the platform producers and C the 
consumers. The relations among the agents can be summarised in this way:  
 
The consumers have a direct relationship with the other two agents since they buy 
the platform and the software. 
 
The platform suppliers provide the hardware to consumers. However, platform 
producers also have a direct relationship with software suppliers, since they can 
charge royalties or provide subsidies. Moreover, platform suppliers can provide 
S 
P 
C 
Fig 2.1: In this scheme it is possible to see the basic interactions among agents. The 
fitted lines represent the material interactions while the dashed lines are the 
monetary interactions 
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software suppliers with the codes which are necessary to program a videogame 
for a given console (product interaction). 
 
Finally the software suppliers have a direct connection with the platform suppliers 
and the consumers, as illustrated above. 
 
Consumers are interested in the whole system. The overall system costs will 
depend on the overall system chosen, so it is important to consider not just the 
cost of the platform and the cost of the software, but also the technical 
characteristics of a platform and the variety of the software proposed. It will be 
possible for those consumers who evaluate the good very highly to multi-home to 
increase their level of satisfaction (see Case 3). 
 
It is possible for the platform producer to have two margins. They will earn from 
both sides of the market, and eventually they will be able to subsidise one side to 
earn more in the other.  
 
It is important to describe the main characteristics of the good. As we saw before 
this market is characterised by the presence of firms selling software that will be 
used for some consoles. In this context, exclusive arrangements are a possibility. 
Regarding this possibility, it is important to highlight that consoles are involved in a 
competition focused on prices and also on quality. The opportunity to sell a 
console with better videogames than other firms is a very important asset for 
producers.  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts. Initially, a very simple version of the model 
is proposed, but little by little features are added. Each part will begin with a 
description of what the differences are between this and previous models and 
what the new variables are. Furthermore, at the end of each part, there will be a 
short summary that will show what the main economic meanings of the 
equilibriums are. 
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Model one: several videogames produced by one supplier 
 
In this part we analyse what happens in the market when one software developer 
is present and is able to produce more than one videogame. In this contest the 
platform producer will charge a royalty fs that maximises their profits.  
 
The three equations that are going to be used in this part are 
 
[1]    psi pypyyU −−−= 2βα               
 
[2]    pspp cyfp −+=∏               
 
[3]    )( ssss cfpy −−=∏      
      
• ps = price of the software, 
• pp = price of the console, 
• fs  = royalties on the software suppliers (positive or negative) 
• Cp = cost of producing a console 
• Cs = cost of developing the software 
• β  = is a parameter between zero and one 
• α  = is a parameter and is bigger than one  
• y =  number of software items 
 
From this point on, the utility of the consumer will be in the form of [4]. It can be 
noted that, given the parameters α and β, utility increases as the number of 
software items increases. In fact, it is assumed that the utility of enjoying a system 
derives from the number of software items a consumer can have. However, utility 
will decrease after a certain level. This happens because it is assumed that 
consumers will buy the software they appreciate the most first, and will only later 
buy software in which they are less interested. 
It is important to state that in this work the videogames are not perfect substitutes. 
Consumers are concerned about diversity and they will purchase the product that 
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will satisfy them most first and will continue to purchase until their utility is positive. 
In a way similar to that discussed by Dixit and Siglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979), 
the total amount of software bought will be the sum of the choices of the 
consumers in the market. In the present work the equation which describes the 
utility can be thought as a partial equilibrium specialization of the Dixit and Siglitz 
(1977) utility function with fixed quantities and endogenous variety (in this model 
the number of videogames y). The quadratic in y is a second order approximation 
of the general function u= u (y)’. 
 
In more in detail, we use the following function: 
( )βaxU ∑=
         and since β < 1 we will have      ( ) ββ yxU a == ∑    
 
The simplification just performed was possible since the quantity of each game 
bought by a representative consumer is fixed, so x is either zero or one.  What 
matters is the number of games available (‘variety’), y, and utility is concave in 
this.  The quadratic form in y is a second order approximation of an arbitrary 
concave utility function 
 
In the current model we are searching for a partial equilibrium where the number 
of videogames bought y is equal to the number present in the market. Moreover, to 
simplify, we used a cubed version of this formula. Given this dynamic, we will 
arrive at a point where there is no more software which consumers are interested 
in, and so utility will start to decrease. 
 
Since equation [3] gives the price of the software and equation [2] provides the 
price of the platform and the royalty, one more equation is required. Equation [1] 
will provide the number of videogames in the market and the first condition for the 
platform to be bought is that the utility for the consumer is bigger or equal to zero, 
so if Ui ≥ 0. 
 
≥
psi pypyyU −−−=
2βα
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Since we assume that the utility is given by the number of software consumer 
purchases, utility is maximised through the purchase of videogames.  
         
 
]'[ 2 si ypyyy
U
−−=
∂
∂ βα
          β
α
2
spy −=
 
 
Looking at the previous result, one restriction needs to be clarified. It is impossible 
for the consumer to increase their budget. This condition means that  
 
β
α
2
fy
 
In fact, when videogames are extremely cheap or even present in the market for 
free, the number of videogames has to satisfy the previous condition. 
 
Now it is possible to move on to the equation of the software producer [3]: 
 
)( ssss cfpy −−=∏
 
 
Now for the first time we allow the software house to set the price independently 
from the platform producer. 
 
We have to consider that the firm producing the software has to maximise its 
profits; therefore we have to maximise its utility function through the price of the 
software it sells. 
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At this point, we have to focus on the equation of the platform producer profit 
function. We also have to find the point where the platform producer maximises 
revenue; the solution is to look at the prices it is possible to charge on the software 
side. In fact it will be possible to maximise profit by charging the maximum royalty 
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on the price of the software. However, it should be pointed out that the platform 
producer will set the royalty before the software house sets the price. Starting from 
equation [5], we can substitute the values we found before for the number of 
videogames and for the price of the software. We can then maximise the profit 
function through the royalties charged to find the optimal royalty level. Finally, we 
can rearrange the other terms and find the prices and the quantities in equilibrium: 
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82
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We can note that this price involves double marginalisation. In fact, since the 
software house and the platform producer will set the prices so as to maximise 
their own utility and will not consider the total price the consumer will have to pay 
for the complete system, the price will be higher than in the case of the 
maximisation of the price of the overall system. 
 
By substitution it is possible to analyse the utility for the consumer: 
   
psi pypyyU −−−=
2βα pss pcc −+−= ]214[32 αβ
α
 
The previous result suggests that if the platform producer could calculate the price 
of the platform as below, all the utility for the consumer would be extracted. 
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It is also possible to find the profits:  
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Main results from model one 
 
It can be noted that the utility for the consumer is decreasing for the prices 
charged for the software and the hardware increases. At the same time, the profit 
of the software supplier is increasing in the utility of playing for the consumer (α) 
and decreasing in the cost to produce the software. Regarding the profit of the 
platform producer, it is possible to state that it is increasing in the selling price of 
the hardware but decreasing in the cost of production of both the hardware and 
the software. This happens because the revenues of the platform producer come 
from two sides: the sale of the hardware and the royalties charged on the 
software. Any increase in the cost of production of the hardware or the software 
will result in a decrease in the profits of the hardware producer. 
 
However, as reported before, in this model double marginalisation will occur due to 
the behaviour of the platform producer and the software developer. Some of the 
solutions present in the economic literature (like exclusive territorial clauses, 
vertical integration, and so on) are not feasible given the characteristics of this 
model. However, to avoid the occurrence of the double marginalization, the 
hardware manufacturer can impose a two-part tariff and thereby increasing its 
profits. 
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Model two: several suppliers producing one videogame and several 
consumers 
 
This model is an evolution of the previous one; however, here a complication is 
added: there are several consumers and several suppliers of videogames. The 
characteristics of these new features are as follows: consumers are homogeneous 
and the good provided by the software suppliers is uniform too. Moreover, the 
software market is characterised by free entry and every firm can enter to sell their 
product.  
 
It is important to note that although equation [1] gives the number of videogames 
bought, it is not possible to quantify the number of subjects aiming to join the 
market. Given this restrain, we assume that the number of consumers is given and 
so there is no reason to change the structure of the previous system. All that is 
required is to adapt the model to the new scenario. As before, adapting the system 
we have that equation [4] provides the number of software purchased,  [6] gives 
the price of the software and equation [5] provides the price of the platform and of 
the royalty. The equations that are going to be used in this part are 
 [4]            psi pypyyU −−−=
2βα
                        
 
 [5]            pcscpcp cnyfnpn −+=∏                   
 
 [6]            ssscs cfpn −−=∏ )(                   
 
• nc = number of consumers in the market (it is supposed to be positive) 
 
As before, each consumer’s utility derives from the number of videogames she 
can purchase, so her utility function has to be differentiated by the quantity of the 
software. From [7] 
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As in the previous case, y represents the number of videogames in the market. 
Since each firm produces only one videogame, this also represents the number of 
firms which are present in equilibrium. 
 
Since (by the assumptions) each software house produces just one videogame, y 
will represent the maximum number of software firms in the market. Considering 
also that the software market is in perfect competition and firms can enter the 
market freely, [6] should be equal to zero.  
 
It is possible to evaluate the price that can allow a firm to stay in the market; the 
price must satisfy the following condition: 
 
0)( =−− sssc cfpn
   
     which can be rewritten      0=−− sscsc cfnpn
 
So, the price of the software will be  
c
s
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It is possible to note that the price of the software is equal to the average cost. In 
fact the cost of the software is divided by the number of all the customers in the 
market. If we compare this result to the one that was found in the previous model, 
we can note that here the cost of the software, which is fixed, is divided by the 
total number of the consumers present in the market. 
 
Now it is possible to focus on the profit function of the platform producer [5], since 
before we evaluated the number of software y, and now we can substitute it so 
that we will have: 
Now it is possible to substitute the price of the software ps:  
0)( =−−=∏ ssscs cfpn
pcs
s
cpcp cnf
p
npn −
−
+=∏ β
α
2
pcs
c
s
s
cpcp cnf
n
cf
npn −








+−
+=∏ β
α
2
54 
 
Now, as in the preceding case, it is possible to maximise the profit of the platform 
producer for the royalties charged: 
 
If we bring the royalties to the left side and rearrange the signs we get  
c
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Given the differentiation of the profit function, it is possible to note that this point is 
a maximum. It is important also to see the main relationships among the different 
variables. As expected, the royalties increase in the cost of production of the 
console and decrease in the number of consumers. If the number of consumers 
approaches infinity, royalties will tend to the parameter α, which describes the 
evaluation for the market software. It is also now possible to evaluate the values of 
the other variables of the system: 
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Also, the price of the software decreases in the number of consumers. This is to 
be expected, since the cost of developing the software is assumed to be just a 
fixed cost; the more consumers are in the market, the less each consumer will 
have to pay for it. This same pattern is observed in the number of software items 
bought, represented by y. The dynamics here are also the same as the ones 
observed before. If the number of consumers increases, it will cause the fixed cost 
to develop the software to decrease, since the cost will be shared among a bigger 
pool of customers.  
 
It is also possible to evaluate the utility of consumers. From [4] 
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Main results from model two 
 
Since the software firms are in competition among themselves and do not make 
any profits, the platform producer is able to extract all the surplus rents from 
consumers.  
 
It is also possible to compare the utility of consumers in model one and model two. 
First of all, we note that the positive part in model one is divided by 32, and in 
model two it is divided by 16. Moreover, the utility in model two increases in the 
number of consumers. Given in model one there was just one consumer, the utility 
of consumers in equilibrium two (model 2) tends to be higher as the number of 
consumers increases to share fixed costs. 
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Model three: two platforms, Hotelling differentiation 
 
In this case the focus is on what happens when there is more than one platform 
supplier. In particular, we will look at what happens when there are two platforms 
in the market.  
 
The main difference to the previous models is that in model three there are two 
platforms competing in the same market. Now the contest of the competition is a 
single-homing one. In fact, in this market, consumers are allowed to choose one 
platform and, after the purchase, can only buy the software that is available for 
that platform. Once the consumer chooses, it is not possible for him to purchase 
the other platform or to buy the software which is available for the platform he did 
not choose. Summing up, in the previous model there are different software 
suppliers and several consumers. Here one complication is added: now there are 
two differentiated platform producers. 
 
The dynamics observed require an adaptation to the model that has been 
developed. Model three is the first of two versions, as in Armstrong (2006). As in 
the cited paper, the single-homing case and the multi-homing case are analysed. 
The present model analyses what can happen in a market when the conditions 
allow first single-homing and later multi-homing. In the single-homing case, both 
software suppliers and consumers can only join one market. In the multi-homing 
case, the analysis will show what happens when consumers or software producers 
are allowed to join both markets. 
 
To avoid extreme results, for example a small increase in price causing the loss of 
all the customers, a differentiation between software and consumers was 
introduced. In the model t represents the transportation cost for each consumer 
and software house in this market. As in the Hotelling model, t can be interpreted 
as the cost of a given quality of the goods in the market.  
 
In the present model, it will be assumed that the number of videogames in the 
market y is equal to the number of companies. Each company is supposed to 
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produce just one videogame, and this condition holds in reality, since software 
houses usually sell one videogame in a period of several months. We can also 
consider the fact that videogames are different from each other. Each game has at 
least one feature which distinguishes it from another game. This difference can be 
used to understand the role of the parameter t. It is possible to imagine that the 
characteristics of games are in a [0,1] interval and that the extremes are 
associated with one console. As an example, we can imagine that at 0 there are 
features like interactivity which are associated with console A, and at 1 there are 
features like graphic quality which are associated with console B. Each software 
house can decide which kind of videogame is better to produce: a very interactive 
one, a very graphically advanced one, or a combination of both. Since consoles 
are different (as are consumers’ tastes), software houses can also decide which 
platform to produce for.  
 
Another critical feature is the fact that the market is characterised by free entry, 
and so there are no supernormal profits for the firms producing the software. It is 
assumed that consumers’ tastes are uniformly distributed in a [0,1] interval, the 
same interval which characterises the systems. 
 
In the single-homing and the multi-homing case, it is assumed that the complete 
systems, consoles and videogames, are very close substitutes. It is assumed that 
the systems are very similar but not identical. In this sense, the parameter t refers 
to the distance of a given system from the tastes of a consumer. Then, as in the 
classical Hotelling model, it is possible to adopt the parameter t to represent the 
transportation cost each consumer has when he has to choose which console to 
buy. For example, if we consider that two different consoles can focus on different 
kinds of videogames, for instance sport and action videogames, we can put these 
two qualities at the two extremes of the line of characteristics. The parameter t will 
help us to quantify the disutility cost the consumer has to face. 
 
In the two-sided market, the utility functions of the subjects involved are the 
following:  
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In the utility function of consumers [7] the utility is represented by the formula that 
was used until the previous case minus a term which expresses the disutility a 
consumer faces when she has to choose one platform. If she is perfectly satisfied 
by system A, this term will be zero. But if she has to choose the system which is 
closer to her tastes, this parameter represents the cost she incurs in not having 
perfectly matched her tastes with the characteristics of the system she chose. The 
parameter θ indicates which part of the total number of consumers uniformly 
distributed in the [0,1] interval will chose to join system A.  
 
As in the previous stage, in this stage we assume that the software market is in 
perfect competition and is characterised by free entry. Since there are no feasible 
supernormal profits we can equate the profit function of the software house to 
zero. 
 
We can start by evaluating the number of consumers in platform A. As in the 
Hotelling model, we have to equate the utility functions of a consumer when she is 
indifferent to joining platform A or B 
 
tppyyytppyyy BpBsBBBBApAsAAAA θβαθβα −−−−=−−−− 22  
 
At this point we have to consider the fact that the consumers present in the market 
are split into two groups, the ones joining system A and the ones joining system B. 
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We can normalise the total number of consumers to one and say that the 
proportion of the consumers joining platform A and B is equal to one.  
 
      
1=+ AB θθ
   
     which can be rewritten as      01 BA θθ =−  
  
With this result, it is possible to modify the equation we evaluated before and find 
the total proportion of the consumers that decide to join platform A. If we substitute 
and add to each other the terms containing θA and move them to the left side 
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and then regroup everything, we will have the total proportion of consumers 
purchasing platform A: 
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However, we have to consider that now it is important to focus on the number of 
consumers joining one platform, since the number of consumers joining platform A 
is given by the total number of consumers by the proportion of consumers who join 
platform A. So we have:    
 
Aa nn θ=  
Each consumer will maximise her utility by purchasing the optimal yA number of 
videogames. Since the utility of a consumer is given by the number of videogames 
she purchases, we have to differentiate the utility function by the number of 
videogames to find the maximum.  
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The results for consumers joining platforms A and B will then be: 
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Now it is possible to use the number of videogames each consumer will purchase 
to evaluate the total number of consumers who join system A.  
 
All the calculations that have been done to evaluate the number of the consumers 
joining a platform are presented in Appendix 1. The final result is  
 
 
 
 
 
The number of consumers joining console A is equal to half of the market plus the 
difference between prices of the consoles by twice the transportation parameter 
plus a term which expresses the effects the role of the differences in the price of 
the software. 
 
Now we can move on to the profit function of the software houses. We can start 
with the equation for the profits of the software developers [9]: 
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First of all, it should be considered that, owing to the structure of the market, each 
firm present in the market can develop just one product. This means that the total 
number of videogames that are in the market represents the total number of firms. 
However, since the market structure is characterised by free entry and perfect 
competition among the firms, there are no supernormal profits from the software 
developer side. For this reason the profit function of the software houses is equal 
to zero.  
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It is possible to find the basic relationship that links the price of the software with 
the royalties, the cost necessary to develop the software and the number of 
consumers: 
A
s
SAsA
n
cfp +=
   but also   
B
s
SBsB
n
cfp +=
 
 
Since the software market is in perfect competition and there are no barriers to 
entry, the console producers can choose the royalty values which give zero profits 
to the software houses. Given this, we can now move on to the equation of the 
profits of the console producer [8] to find the optimal prices for the console and the 
software.  
 
The profits of the platform producers derive from the total number of hardware 
units sold by its price and by the total amount of royalties charged on the software 
side minus the costs that are necessary to produce the hardware. It is important to 
remember that the cost of the hardware is supposed to be a variable cost. This is 
in contrast to the software side, where the costs are assumed to be fixed.   
 
After substituting the number of software y that each consumer purchases and the 
value of the royalties, it is possible to rewrite the preceding formula in the following 
way: 
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In the previous formula the profit of a platform producer is equal to the revenues 
minus the costs it has from the hardware side and the software side. It is important 
to emphasise that the second term inside the square brackets is the revenue the 
platform producer gets from the software supplier in terms of royalties. It is also 
possible to see, given this, that the profits are influenced in two ways by the 
number of consumers. From the hardware side, they are influenced directly, since 
pASAAApAApA cnfynpn −+=Π
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the difference between the price charged for the hardware and its costs is 
multiplied by the number of consumers. However, it is also possible to note that 
there are economies of scale in the software side, since the revenues from the 
software are influenced by the number of consumers, but the cost of the software 
is not influenced by the number of consumers.  
 
Now we can substitute for the number of consumers we evaluated before and find 
the optimal price of the console by deriving an equation incorporating the price of 
the console and the price of the software to find the optimums which can provide 
the platform producers with the highest profits. The profits of the platform producer 
are maximised by the price of the hardware, and after the differentiation and 
considering that n is a fixed number, we have: 
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Since the first equilibrium condition is satisfied, we can assume that the 
equilibrium is symmetric for both platforms, so we can simplify and consider that 
the prices of both platforms and software are equal. This assumption will simplify 
the preceding equation, and we will have: 
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Which allows us to evaluate the optimal price for both platforms: 
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We can note that the software platform figure is multiplied by the number of 
software units sold in the market. In fact we can rewrite the optimal prices of the 
hardware in the following way: 
sAAppA pytcp −+=       and     sBBppB pytcp −+=  
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If we compare these results to the standard Hotelling model, which is:
 
tcp +=
 
It is possible to see that the model brings us to: tcpyp Sp +=∗+  
In fact we have to consider that for consumers what is important is the system 
platform plus videogames. Usually in the standard Hotelling model there is just 
one kind of good. However, in this model consumers need at least one platform 
and one videogame to enter the market. 
 
We can see that for the platform producer the price is increasing with respect to 
the cost of producing every platform. The price is also increasing with respect to 
the t parameter. This effect was expected, since t is a measure of the difference 
between one platform and the other. An increase in the difference between 
platforms will strengthen the position of the platform producers, meaning they can 
charge higher prices. There is also a negative relationship between the price of the 
hardware and the price of the software. This reminds us of the fact that since 
hardware and software are a bundle, increases in the hardware price will have a 
negative effect on the software side and vice versa. Given this result it is possible 
to speculate on compensations between the price of the hardware and the price of 
the software.  
 
We also need to stress that all the revenues of the platform producers come from 
the consumer side. This is due to the characteristics of the software market. The 
software market is characterised by free entry, and supernormal profits are not 
possible for software firms. Since there are no profits, it is impossible for the 
platform to exploit them. However, for the platform producers it will be possible to 
exploit the consumer side from both the hardware and the software side. 
 
Now we can focus on the optimal price of the software. Since the calculations are 
quite long, they are reported in the second part of Appendix 1. The final prices of 
the software are: 
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Since it is known that   2
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  and given that royalties are: 
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The latest results imply that the royalties are zero:  
 
0== SBSA ff  
The last result means that platform producers are not willing to distort the software 
market. This means that for platform producers it will be better not to have 
earnings from royalties but to recover the profits from the price of the hardware. 
 
Given these results, it appears that platform producers secure earnings only from 
the hardware side. It is possible to use these values to obtain the price of the 
hardware by substitution. Since the price of the hardware was  
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Also in this part it is possible to work on the market of system A and later to appeal 
to the symmetry. If at first the values of the price of the software are substituted 
then it is possible to simplify the last term by the number of consumers in the 
market by 2, which is present in the numerator and in the denominator:  
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It is possible to note that the equilibrium is symmetrical and the price of the 
hardware, given the previous condition, will be the same for both consoles. 
 
However, it is possible to rewrite the preceding results, considering that the last 
term is the number of software items multiplied by the average cost of the 
software: 
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Regarding the number of consumers, it is possible to substitute the values that 
have just been found and use them to evaluate the formula that was stated 
previously: 
 
Since the prices of the software and of the hardware in equilibrium are the same, it 
will be the case that in equilibrium consumers will split exactly in half.  
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These results imply that in equilibrium consumers will split exactly in half between 
the two platforms and that the two groups will be characterised by the same 
number of consumers.  
 
The total number of software units and software firms present in the market will be 
given by the formula of y that was found previously:  
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Since the price of the software was the same in both markets, it is possible to work 
just on the number of platform A software units to also find the equilibrium in 
market B. If the price of the software is substituted with what was found  
 
It is also possible to evaluate the platform producers’ profits by substituting the 
terms just found in the platform producer profit function. By substituting these 
values in the starting equation of the platform’s profits formula, it is clear that the 
revenues for the hardware producers come just from the hardware side, since the 
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revenues from the software side are going to simplify to zero. In the end, after the 
simplifications we will have: 
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At this point, it is possible to investigate the relationship among the variables. It is 
easy to see that the profits of the platform are increasing for the parameter t that 
individuates the degree of difference between the two platforms. However, to 
understand the role of the number of consumers, it is necessary to perform some 
comparative statics. If we differentiate the profit of a platform producer by the 
number of consumers, it will be possible to highlight this relationship. 
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Given this result it is possible to evaluate the relationship between the number of 
consumers and the other parameters:     
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It is also possible to evaluate the total utility of consumers in this market contest. 
Starting from equation [7] we can substitute the values we discovered to find: 
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Main results from model three 
 
We can see that prices in equilibrium are equal. Since it was assumed that the 
fixed costs were equal for all the software producers, the final price will be the 
average price of producing the software. Given this result, the size of the market is 
very important. In fact, as the number of consumers increases, the number of 
software units will increase, and as the price of the software and hardware 
decreases, the profits of the hardware producers and the utility of consumers will 
increase. Moreover, if the differentiation increases between systems (which means 
if the t parameter increases), there will be an increase in the profits of the 
hardware producers, but the utility of the consumers will decrease.  
 
It appears that in equilibrium there are no royalties charged to software producers. 
The hardware producer’s revenues come only from the hardware side. It appears 
that the total profits of the platform producers are positively influenced not only by 
the utility of playing of consumers but also by the number of consumers, and are 
negatively influenced by the cost of the software. Due to the fact there are no 
royalties charged on the software and the price in equilibrium is equal to the 
average cost of producing each copy of the software; it is possible to analyse what 
will happen if there is the opportunity for firms to collude and set the price of the 
software higher than the equilibrium price. 
 
If firms collude to set the price of the software, the price of the software will 
become exogenous and firms will gain fixed revenues from that. However, 
because of the consumer utility, the number of videogames purchased will 
decrease. Given the condition of zero profits for the software suppliers, this will 
cause the hardware producers’ profits to increase, since they can profit from the 
loss of utility to consumers, and the part of the profits that derive from the 
hardware side will not be affected by any change. Though, this equilibrium is not 
stable. The incentive to deviate from fixed royalties would lead to firms charging 
lower royalties to decrease the final price for the consumer and gain more of the 
market. Provided both firms know this incentive to cheat, firms will continue to 
charge the equilibrium prices. 
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Model four: multi-homing 
 
In this section we analyse what happens when the previous case conditions do not 
hold any longer. The main characteristic of the single-homing equilibrium was the 
fact that each consumer had a choice between two different systems, each 
characterised by different qualities and different videogames. At the same time, it 
was possible for the software suppliers to operate in just one market, so software 
produced for platform A would not have been available for platform B.  
 
This section, however, will analyse how it is possible to avoid choosing between 
producing software for one market or the other. It considers the equilibrium where 
videogames are sold on both platforms. The reason why software houses would 
want a videogame to be available on both platforms is that in this way they would 
be able to reach a bigger pool of consumers. Moreover, it is a fact that in the real 
world, some videogames are developed and sold for more than one console. 
 
Given the market structure, the equilibrium is going to be quite different from the 
preceding one, where the videogames were sold for just one platform. The fact 
that the utility consumers gain comes only from the videogames they play, the fact 
that the videogame market is characterised by perfect competition and the fact 
that there is no constraint on quantities all contribute to a bottleneck case very 
close to a competition à la Bertrand.  
 
One of the main differences to the single-homing case is the absence of the 
parameter t, which indicates the difference between platforms. Since all utility for 
consumers comes from playing videogames, the possibility of playing the same 
videogame on the two consoles that are present in the market makes consumers 
indifferent between the two platforms. Since there is not a qualitative difference 
between playing the two consoles, the t parameter is equal to zero.  
 
In this model the author is aware of the fact that firms are willing to differentiate 
themselves to introduce a certain kind of friction in the market that can justify a 
difference in prices. Such difference can be introduced in the market by investing 
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in advertisement, in the final design of the product, in special agreements with 
sellers, and so on. However, since in this model the utility of consumers derives 
from the number of videogames they can play, such strategies have no influence 
on the choices of consumers. 
 
Given the assumptions that the cost of a console is equal for both platforms and 
that there are no supernormal profits for the software houses, it can be easily 
verified that the platforms will be sold in the market for zero profits. Any other 
strategy would be a losing one. In fact, if one platform producer sells the platform 
for a different price than the average one, this would not be a winning strategy. If 
the price were lower, the platform producer would incur losses. If the price were 
higher, it would be possible for the opponent to sell the platform at a slightly lower 
price and gain all the market. 
 
As in the previous cases, it will be possible to maximise consumers’ utility by 
maximising the number of videogames they can buy. In this setting, the choice of 
the consumer is driven by the number of videogames that are sold in multi-homing 
contexts and by the prices of the hardware and software, which are the same. The 
equations that are used are the following ones: 
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It is possible to observe that equation [11], expressing the profits of a platform (in 
this case platform A), depends on the way consumers split between different 
platforms. However, given the assumptions, it is possible to state that consumers 
will split perfectly in half between the two platforms that are present in the market: 
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Since customers are willing to maximise their utility, we have to derive equation 
[10] using the number of videogames and find the maximum.  
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At this stage we can focus on the profit function of the software producers [12]. 
Since their profits are zero, it is possible to find the equilibrium price at which the 
software is sold in the market, and so the price of the software will be  
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Using these results we can move on to the equation of the profits of the platform 
producers, also remembering that in this case there are no supernormal profits.  
 
Remembering that the number of consumers joining platform A is equal to half of 
the consumers that are present in the market, and performing an easy substitution 
of the other variables and considering that the number of consumers is exogenous 
and present in all the terms, it is possible to simplify the equation: 
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However, if we evaluate the royalties by substituting the value of the price of the 
platform in the profit function of the platform producer, the solution will indicate that 
the platform did not earn anything from the software side and that the royalties are 
zero. So in the end  
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As expected, the results show that, given zero profits, royalties will be zero and the 
price of the hardware will be equal to the fixed cost necessary to produce the 
hardware. 
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Given these results, we can come back to the equation of the number of 
videogames that are purchased by consumers y, substituting the results obtained: 
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Finally, it is possible to evaluate the utility of each consumer in the market by 
substituting all the results obtained in equation [10]: 
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Main results from model four 
 
Here it is possible analyse this result by investigating the relationships among the 
different variables. First of all, the number of consumers present in the market has 
a positive effect on the utility of each consumer. As expected, there is a negative 
relationship between the utility of consumers on one hand and the cost of 
developing the software together with the cost of producing a platform on the 
other.  
 
In the end what we can see in this market structure is that the opportunity for 
software houses to multi-home allows consumers to maximise their utility, while 
the profits of the platform producers are driven to zero.  
 
It is also possible to make a comparison between this model, which allows multi-
homing, and the previous one, which was characterised by single-homing. Table 
2.1 is a report of the three most important variables: number of videogames, the 
price of the platform and price of the software. 
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Table 2.1: This table reports the different values of the most important variables that were 
evaluated for the single-homing and multi-homing contests. 
 
Here, we can note that consumers are better off in the multi-homing contest. In 
fact, this situation is characterised by a higher number of videogames present in 
the market combined with lower prices for platforms and videogames.  
 
However, it should to be pointed out that these conclusions are influenced by the 
assumptions that  there is no differentiation between platforms in the multi-homing 
model. As reported previously, it is the opinion of the author that in this contest, the 
possibility of multi-homing determines the ability to play different videogames with 
the same machine. Given that the utility of the consumer derives from the number 
of videogames she can play, there is no difference between the two consoles that 
allow the player to play the same videogames.  
 
Firms can certainly do something to differentiate their console from the others 
present in the market, such as invest in advertisements, develop different designs, 
and so on. However, these strategies are not relevant to the equilibrium that was 
analysed. 
Table 2.1 
Analysis of the difference in sales  
 Single-homing Multi-homing 
Number of videogames 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While working on the theoretical model, the author started to think about the 
possibility of building a database. 
 
The main aim was to investigate the most important dynamics that characterise 
the evolution of prices. While reading the articles that were reported in the 
literature review, it emerged that although a lot of papers were written on two-sided 
markets and on single-homing and multi-homing, the most significant emphasis 
was on the setting of the market and prices. However, the pricing strategies were 
never considered in a dynamic way. A good example is provided by Rysman 
(2009), who in his paper summarised the most recent development of the literature 
in this field. It is evident that most of the existing literature, when focused on 
pricing, investigated the conduct of a market, such as in Argentesi and Filistrucchi 
(2007), or attempted to describe the behaviour of consumers, such as in Rysman 
(2007). However, the videogames market offers the possibility of comparing goods 
that are sold in a single-homing and in a multi-homing way, and allows for the 
adoption of a dynamic point of view. 
 
The dataset was developed to investigate a reality that is dynamic. The research 
here tries to highlight the differences between a good differentiated by the fact that 
it is sold in a single-homing way and one sold in a multi-homing way. To do so, a 
database was developed to investigate such peculiarities. 
 
The database was built considering the evolution of the price of videogames over 
time. For some videogames, the price charged when the game entered the market 
was known, but there were not so many observations as the ones obtained by 
filling the database on a regular basis for a long period of time.  
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A second problem lies in the fact that in the proposed model, single-homing and 
multi-homing industries are separate. However, in the observed market, single-
homing videogames coexist together with multi-homing videogames. Moreover, 
both strategies, single-homing and multi-homing, were present in the top ten best-
selling videogames for all the three consoles.  
 
The dataset was very useful because it highlighted that there are actually 
differences in the evolution of prices during the observation period. The results are 
reported in the following part of the chapter. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
While working on the previous chapter, the writer was curious to investigate 
whether there was a difference in the pricing of videogames. Was the starting price 
different? Would the price behave differently for videogames sold through single-
homing and multi-homing strategies? Were there examples that could stimulate 
more theoretical works? Were the two sales options so important?  
 
In the first chapter there was a discussion about the studies that have been 
conducted relating to two-sided markets, such as the credit card market (Rochet 
and Tirole 2003). In these studies the author was searching out the possible 
strategies that a platform could use to gain higher profits.  
 
This work analysed the videogames market. The videogames market is a two-
sided one because there are firms producing a platform, and on one side there are 
firms developing videogames and on the other side there are consumers. 
However, videogames have some peculiarities that needed to be considered. First 
of all, in the market there are videogames sold in a single-homing way and 
videogames sold in a multi-homing way. This characteristic turned out to be very 
useful; it was possible to make a direct comparison in this market between goods 
sold in single-homing and multi-homing. 
 
76 
Secondly, when a videogame enters the market there can be a launch effect. In 
the author’s opinion, videogames have some characteristics of durable goods 
(Tirole 1988; Stole 2007). 
 
As the economics literature points out, durable goods are products with particular 
characteristics that mean they are priced in a different way from other products. 
The fact that their utility lasts over a long period of time makes their pricing 
interesting. When producers sell their product at a high price to consumers that 
are characterised by a high level of utility, there are still consumers aiming to 
purchase their good but at a lower price. Then, to increase their sales, producers 
decrease the price to satisfy this group with an unsatisfied demand. This process 
can continue until the price reaches the marginal cost and no more profits are 
feasible for sellers.  
 
Videogames too can be considered durable goods. A firm would like to sell the 
videogame at first at a high price to the consumers who show high valuation for 
the videogame. After this group of consumers is satisfied, the firm can lower the 
price to satisfy consumers showing a lower valuation. This process will end when it 
is not possible to satisfy any customer without losses for the firm. However, in the 
case of videogames, this process is accelerated by the fact that new videogames 
continuously enter the market. The fact that new and different videogames enter 
the market will speed up the normal process of aging, because if old videogames 
are still in the market they need to be cheaper than the new ones.  
 
The author, before setting the database, was expecting the price of videogames to 
decrease over time. However, a difference between single-homing videogames 
and multi-homing videogames was expected too. It was the writer’s idea that 
prices could decrease in a linear way until the price reached a certain threshold 
level, when it would be stable. It was thought that this process in single-homing 
videogames and multi-homing videogames would differ only in the decrease rate. 
It was supposed that prices of videogames sold in a multi-homing way would 
decrease faster than prices of videogames sold in a single-homing way. The 
reason is that videogames sold in multi-homing would face harsher competition 
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than the ones in single-homing. This higher level of competition should push the 
firms present in the market to lower the prices more quickly to stay competitive 
against rivals. 
 
However, the database analysis showed something different. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The database, which shows videogame prices, was built on a weekly basis. The 
analysis was based on UK data, and prices were taken from different websites 
from the end of May 2008 to the beginning of September 2009. The websites were 
all British; this was to ensure a high level of comparability. The prices were 
recorded every weekend, and every week the cache of the computer was cleared. 
In total three websites were monitored: Amazon UK, Game Play and Game. The 
decision to observe three different online shops was made due to the fact that it 
was possible to increase the number of observations, check if the results were 
common for all of them, so as to reach a high level of significance, and to avoid 
particular promotions or contingencies (such as difficulties in selling a particular 
game on just one website, etc.). 
 
 
This approach was chosen after the author initially tried to collect prices by 
physically visiting different stores. However, this methodology was too time-
demanding and difficult to pursue. The main difficulty was that videogames are 
usually present in a shop in large volumes at the point of their release. However, 
as time passes by, it can become quite difficult to find them. Since this research 
was focused on the long-term analysis of videogame prices, this approach was not 
considered successful. The solution was to refer to different websites selling 
videogames. The biggest advantage was that websites usually stock a greater 
number of videogames than do small shops. It was assumed by the author that for 
a consumer there is no difference in the utility given by playing a videogame 
bought on a website and playing one bought in a traditional shop. Moreover, it has 
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to be considered that videogame consumers are individuals who are quite 
interested in new technologies, and so the author assumed that websites were a 
good substitution for traditional shops. 
 
It should be mentioned that the pricing strategies of the different websites were 
analysed too. If this research was expected to highlight differences in the pricing of 
videogames, it also showed that the pricing strategy of one the three websites, 
Amazon, was consistent with Varian (1980), Baye-Morgan (2004) and Ellison 
&Ellison (2005). More in detail it appear that the two websites Game Play and 
Game where using the same strategy pricing the videogames. in the third 
appendix there is a representation of the price evolution of the entire dataset and it 
is possible to observe that the price patterns are almost the same for this two 
websites. Instead, it appear that the Amazon UK strategy is not just different. It 
seems that Amazon UK is pricing for two different pools of consumers: the 
informed ones and the uninformed ones. When the price of a given videogame 
was the lowest, Amazon could sell to informed and uninformed players gaining 
very low profits per game. However, when the price was the highest, Amazon UK 
could sell just to uninformed players but gaining higher profit for each videogame 
sold. 
 
The videogames considered were chosen because they were the best-selling 
videogames during the week the database collection was started. In this way the 
possibility of any involuntary data manipulation was avoided from the beginning. 
The sample chosen was considered big enough to avoid any particular dynamic 
skewing the sample, such as an increasing interest for sport games when a big 
sport event is close (European football championship, etc.), a new version of the 
same game (successful videogames are sometimes developed and continued in 
sagas), and so on. To increase the sample size, a few videogames were added 
later in the same week, but this operation was done in the same way: the best-
selling videogames of that week were added. 
 
Finally it has to be mentioned that the top ten videogames were for all the three 
consoles that were present in the market and that needed a television to work. 
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Moreover, the analysis was focused on the latest console technology that 
appeared in the market in the second half of the preceding decade. This was done 
because the videogames that sold the most were all for these machines and 
because it was easy to compare videogames of different consoles that from a 
technological point of view were quite similar.  
 
The videogames are representative of all three videogame consoles that require a 
television for the consumer to interact with them. The three consoles were Wii, 
Playstation 3 and Xbox 360. All of them are characterised by different features. For 
example Playstation 3 can play blu-ray DVDs, while Xbox 360 cannot; Wii cannot 
play DVDs at all. However, when this research was started Wii presented a 
revolutionary technology to interact with the machine, by using devices that could 
catch the actions of the body; the machine could interpret these movements and 
use them to let the gamer interact with the videogame. The other two consoles 
instead presented a traditional device made of levers and buttons that the players 
had to push to play. Also, the processors that were present in all the three 
machines were quite different and consequently so were the graphical 
performances. 
 
Consoles were different in performance, appearance and price; moreover, the 
costumer target group was quite different. If Playstation 3 was the third generation 
of a very successful family of consoles and Xbox was also quite successful in its 
preceding generation, Wii was oriented to less mature players and to consumers 
that had never played videogames before.  
 
Despite all these differences, shops proposed these consoles as alternatives to 
each other. The consoles are close to each other to allow multi-homing games. 
The main reason for this approach is that there are several videogames that are 
proposed for all of them and they are quite comparable. The possibility of playing 
the same videogame using different consoles suggests that the console must be 
quite similar. Secondly, all the consoles were launched almost at the same time. 
Finally, the console manufacturer considers the others as competitors in the same 
market.  
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Given all these conditions, the research tried to highlight the main dynamics that 
are present in this particular market and to find some empirical evidence in relation 
to the model that was proposed in the previous chapter.  
 
 
 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 
Summary 
 
Monitoring the three websites, it was possible to build a database of 70 
videogames of three different games consoles sold on different retail websites. 
The representations of all the prices of these videogames are fully available in an 
appendix at the end of the present work.  
 
Videogames were identified according to whether they were sold in a multi-homing 
way (for different consoles) or in a single-homing way (just for one console). It was 
hoped that this would reveal whether these two approaches have different real-
world effects. Since the decision of single-homing would imply that not all of the 
market of consumers could be reached, it was expected that there would be a 
difference in the pricing strategy in respect to the price of the videogames sold in 
multi-homing. 
 
This collection work took quite a long time, but after a few months it was clear that 
there was an actual difference in the pricing strategy between the videogames 
sold in single-homing in respect to the ones present on more platforms. It 
appeared that the price of videogames sold for just one console was more 
constant, and also the variance was much less than that characterising the 
videogames sold on more consoles.  
 
 
81 
TABLE 3.1 
AVERAGE PRICES CHARGED BY SHOPS 
AMAZON 20.59 
GAME PLAY 24.05 
GAME 21.37 
 
Table 3.1. In this table the average of the prices of the videogames that were 
collected is evaluated; in this case prices are differentiated by the online shops 
that were observed. 
TABLE 3.2 
AVERAGE PRICES CHARGED BY CONSOLES 
WII 22.62 
PLAYSTATION 3 24.19 
XBOX 360 22.76 
 
Table 3.2. In this table the average of the prices of the videogames that were 
collected is evaluated; in this case prices are differentiated by the different 
consoles that were examined. 
 
 
TABLE 3.3 
AVERAGE PRICES CHARGED BY AGE 
AFTER 4 WEEKS 31.99 
AFTER 8 WEEKS 30.89 
AFTER 16 WEEKS  27.95 
AFTER 64 WEEKS 25.25 
AFTER 74 WEEKS 15.33 
 
Table 3.3. In this table the average of the prices of the videogames that were 
collected is evaluated; in this case prices are differentiated by the age in the 
market. 
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TABLE 3.4 
AVERAGE PRICES CHARGED  
SINGLE-HOMING 22.68 
MULTI-HOMING 20.47 
 
 
Table 3.4. In this table the average of the prices of the videogames that were 
collected is evaluated; in this case prices are differentiated by the way the 
videogame was sold: single-homing or multi-homing. 
TABLE 3.5 
AVERAGE PRICES DURING DIFFERENT PERIODS  
NORMAL PERIOD 21.31 
CHRISTMAS PERIOD 20.72 
 
Table 3.5. In this table the average of the prices of the videogames that were 
collected is evaluated; in this case the possibility is investigated of a special 
occurrence such as Christmas having an influence on the price of videogames. 
 
TABLE 3.6 
AVERAGE QUALITY OF VIDEOGAMES 
CONSOLE 
Single 
Homing 
Multi 
Homing 
INHOUSE EXTERNAL Average 
WII 72.329 71.523 79.907 70.210 72.001 
PLAYSTATION 3 87.741 74.999 84.390 76.059 76.733 
XBOX 360 84.507 75.327 88.443 75.583 78.314 
      
Average 78.682 74.484 84.981 74.168  
 
Table 3.6. In this table the average quality of the videogames that were collected is 
evaluated. In this case prices are differentiated by the way the videogame was 
sold: either developed by the same firm manufacturing the console or not, and  
sold either in single-homing or multi-homing. Marks go from 0 (the worst) to 100 
(the maximum). The averages are provided by the website "gameranking.com". 
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It is possible to comment on these results. First of all it is possible to observe that 
there is a difference in the quality of videogames. It appears that the quality of 
videogames sold in single-homing is higher than the quality of videogames sold in 
multi-homing. Moreover, this difference is usually more pronounced when the 
single-homing videogame is developed by the firm which also does produce the 
console. 
 
This shows that actually there is a difference between videogames sold in single-
homing and those sold in multi-homing. To build their installed base of consumers, 
console manufacturers aim to provide the most high quality videogames to 
persuade consumers to purchase their console.  
 
 
Examples 
 
The following graphs show the most relevant cases that the author highlights as 
examples that better illustrate the differences in the paths of videogames. While 
looking at the graphs, it is important to note that the time in the graphs refers to the 
observation week. However, when the prices are regressed, the author considered 
the age of videogames in the market. The main problem is that usually 
videogames are sold at a certain price; however, after a few months, the price 
decreases. Since this decrease can also be quite significant, comparing prices of 
videogames without considering this effect would be misleading. 
 
The next six graphs represent videogames sold both in single-homing and in multi-
homing for the three different consoles, and are reported to highlight the 
differences in the price evolution over time. It is important to stress that the 
following graphs are the most extremes cases that came out after the dataset was 
completed. The author reported them in this part because in this way it is possible 
to start to get an idea of the main dynamics that are going to be discussed later. 
The graphs of the complete database are in the third appendix. 
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Single-Home Videogames 
 
 
Fig 3.1. Evolution of the flattest price pattern for a single-home videogame sold for 
the console Wii; the three colours refer to the three different websites observed.  
  
 
Fig 3.2. Evolution of the flattest price pattern for a single-home videogame sold for 
the console PS3; the three colours refer to the three different websites observed. 
 
 
Fig 3.3. Evolution of the flattest price pattern for a single-home videogame sold for 
the console Xbox 360; the three colours refer to the three different websites 
observed. 
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Multi Home Videogames 
 
 
Fig 3.4. Evolution of the price pattern for a multi-home videogame sold for the 
console Wii; the three colours refer to the three different websites observed.  
 
Fig 3.5. Evolution of the most extreme price pattern for a multi-home videogame 
sold for the console PS3; the three colours refer to the three different websites 
observed. 
 
  
Fig 3.6. Evolution of the most extreme price pattern for a multi-home videogame 
sold for the console Xbox 360; the three colours refer to the three different 
websites observed. 
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As stated earlier, the aim of the author was to find any difference in the pattern of 
the videogame prices during a particular period. The author expected to find that 
prices were decreasing over time; however the big question was if there was a 
difference between videogames sold just for one console and ones sold for two or 
three consoles. Since the period was longer than a year, it was the opinion of the 
author that such a difference could emerge. The author was conscious of the 
possibility that the resulting time series might not be perfectly continuous, since 
some videogames might be out of stock for a while. Unfortunately this was the 
case, but the general analysis was not compromised by this event. Looking at all 
the graphs that are present in the third appendix, it is possible to note some 
interruptions; however, the price pattern can always be guessed easily.  
 
Comparing the differences in the paths of videogames, it is evident that the most 
stable prices during the observation were all for videogames sold just for one 
platform. As the graphs reported, this is true for all the three consoles.  
 
The three graphs represent the videogames that for each one of the three 
consoles exhibit the most stable prices during the study. Analysing all the possible 
interpretations, the most logical conclusion is that there is an actual difference in 
the price of videogames depending on whether they are sold just for one platform 
or for different platforms.  
 
The results show that the price of videogames sold in single-homing is decreasing 
over time. However, the price of videogames sold in multi-homing is decreasing in 
a different pattern. Initially the price is relatively high and continues to be high for a 
few weeks. Later on the price decreases steeply until it reaches a level that will 
become the definitive price for the rest of the observed period. This is clearly 
evident from the images reported above; however, similar results are presents in 
the graphs reported in the third appendix. 
 
Given the observations reported before, it is possible to specify the equations that 
the author was looking for. The equation that best describes the pattern is the 
following cubic one: 
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Equation 3.1   32 xxxcPSS γβα −+−=  
 
This equation was chosen because it would be the most flexible in highlighting the 
dynamic patterns that arise in pricing single-homing videogames and multi-homing 
videogames.  
 
In fact the cubic formula allows different forms. By changing the different 
parameters, many possible combinations are created that represent a broad range 
of possibilities for describing the evolution of prices. 
 
However, a clarification is required. Since the prices that are collected refer to 
prices charged by online shops, pricing is in the power of the retailers, who have 
their own strategies. These strategies should emerge in an analysis of the prices 
charged over time. If a panel data analysis is made we can see that: 
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TABLE 3.7 
Panel data analysis on the three websites 
 Amazon Game Play Game 
 Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| Coefficient P>|z| 
t -0.30 0.00 -0.09 0.08 -0.33 0.00 
td -0.44 0.00 -0.26 0.00 -0.30 0.00 
t2 0.002 0.03 -0.003 0.00 0.00 0.32 
t2d 0.005 0.00 -0.004 0.02 0.00 0.00 
t3 -5.12e-06 0.30 0.00 0.00 3.97e-06 0.35 
t3d 0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
dummy 7.81 0.00 3.49 0.07 4.34 0.02 
constant 32.21 0.00 32.63 0.00 36.17 0.00 
 
Table 3.7. This table reports the values that describe the pricing 
strategies of the three websites that were monitored. 
 
The above table presents the analysis that has been done on the prices that were 
collected in the database by using the equation 3.1. It is possible to observe that 
although the prices refer to the same videogames sold in the same period of time, 
the coefficient of the parameters are quite different. In the next section a more 
accurate work will be presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
Econometric analysis 
 
To analyse all the collected data, the statistical software “Stata” was used. All the 
prices collected were rearranged and ordered by videogame, console, age in the 
market, website and presence in just one console or in more than one. After these 
preliminary works, a model was run that could fit the evolution of the prices. The 
author tried to regress the prices through time and to test whether the prices were 
decreasing linearly or if they were decreasing following another pattern. In 
particular, as reported in the previous paragraph, the author, by looking at the data 
that were collected and the relevant graphs, started to get an idea of the possible 
equations that could describe the patterns. By analysing the graphs reported in the 
appendix at the end of the present work, the author tested an “s” pattern where 
prices were at first constant, then decreased and then finally returned to being 
constant. It was assumed that the prices of videogames sold for more than one 
console would fit such a pattern. At the same time it was expected that 
videogames sold just for one console would not have the same pattern and that 
the same pattern would be rejected.  
 
The following tables summarise the most important results. The tables are divided 
by console; this is due to the fact that the author wanted to test if the results were 
common to all the consoles or if they were different. 
 
In regard to the tables, it should be mentioned that the dummy parameter is set to 
1 for multi-homing videogames while it is zero for videogames sold in single-
homing. The other parameters represent the constant factor plus the other 
parameters that influence the price over time: time (T), time squared (T2) and time 
cubed (T3). The value of the dummy for all the parameters is also expressed, and 
the third column reports the significance of the single parameters that were 
evaluated.  
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Table 3.8 
Wii videogames 
 General Amazon Game Play Game 
Parameters Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Constant 31.39432 0.000 30.24866 0.00 29.4436 0.00 33.9309 0.00 
Dummy 11.06089    0.000 7.23393 0.04 15.4218 0.00 13.5241 0.00 
T -0.236704 0.000 -0.23661 0.00 -0.0991 0.12 -0.3551 0.00 
TD -0.754817 0.000 -0.30876 0.02 -1.1285 0.00 -1.0570 0.00 
T2 0.000605 0.435 0.00093 0.38 -0.0019 0.09 0.0024 0.03 
t2d 0.013843 0.000 0.00229 0.39 0.0229 0.00 0.0216 0.00 
t3 2.32e-06 0.545 0.00000 0.85 0.0000 0.01 0.0000 0.27 
t3d -0.000081 0.000 0.00001 0.75 -0.0001 0.00 -0.0001 0.00 
 
Table 3.8. Results of the tested model for the prices collected for the single-
homing and multi-homing videogames sold for the console Wii. 
 
 
Fig 3.7. In this graph the prices of videogames sold for the console Wii in single-
homing and multi-homing are scattered against the age in the market. It is possible 
to note the different patterns that characterise them. 
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Table 3.9 
PS3  videogames 
 General Amazon Game Play Game 
Parameters Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Constant 25.3703 0.00 31.9561 0.00 8.0803 0.12 25.0366 0.00 
Dummy 11.6725 0.01 9.9311 0.04 23.3543 0.00 11.7986 0.01 
T 0.5167 0.03 -0.3664 0.29 2.4665 0.00 0.8710 0.00 
TD -0.8177 0.00 -0.3992 0.27 -2.3014 0.00 -1.1068 0.00 
T2 -0.0170 0.01 0.0067 0.45 -0.0781 0.00 -0.0278 0.00 
t2d 0.0145 0.02 0.0008 0.93 0.0667 0.00 0.0233 0.00 
t3 0.0001 0.01 -0.0001 0.44 0.0007 0.00 0.0002 0.00 
t3d -0.0001 0.06 0.0000 0.74 -0.0006 0.00 -0.0002 0.01 
 
 
Table 3.9. Results of the tested model for the prices collected for the single-
homing and multi-homing videogames sold for the console PS3. 
 
 
Fig 3.8. In this graph the prices of videogames sold for the console Playstation 3 in 
single-homing and multi-homing are scattered against the age in the market. It is 
possible to note here the different patterns that characterise them. 
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Table 3.10 
Xbox  videogames 
 General Amazon Game Play Game 
Parameters Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Constant 39.1694 0.00 37.9470 0.00 38.8482 0.00 39.8253 0.00 
Dummy 1.1615 0.67 2.3506 0.49 5.3279 0.19 0.1651 0.96 
T -0.4086 0.00 -0.5973 0.00 -0.1121 0.20 -0.3773 0.00 
TD -0.3886 0.00 -0.4288 0.02 -1.0952 0.00 -0.2053 0.16 
T2 0.0015 0.22 0.0077 0.00 -0.0061 0.00 -0.0005 0.76 
t2d 0.0086 0.00 0.0079 0.03 0.0293 0.00 0.0044 0.14 
t3 0.0000 0.72 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 0.05 
t3d -0.0001 0.00 -0.0001 0.02 -0.0002 0.00 0.0000 0.11 
 
Table 3.10. Results of the tested model for the prices collected for the single-
homing and multi-homing videogames sold for the console Xbox 360. 
 
 
 
Fig 3.9. In this graph the prices of videogames sold for the console Xbox 360 in 
single-homing and multi-homing are scattered against the age in the market. Here 
the patterns are quite different from the previous ones; however there are still 
differences between single-homing videogames and multi-homing videogames. 
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Looking at the results, it appears that there are actually differences in the evolution 
of the prices of videogames sold in single-homing and videogames sold in multi-
homing. This is particularly evident in respect to the videogames for the different 
consoles. The low significance of the parameters time squared and time cubed 
means that the pattern of the price in time is different, and videogames sold in 
single-homing tend to decrease in a linear way. Prices of videogames sold in a 
multi-homing way are characterised by a different pattern. In this case prices seem 
to start at a high level but the pattern of decrease is much stronger and the price 
falls at a higher rate than the one of videogames sold in a single-homing way. 
However, when the price arrives at a certain level, different for all videogames, the 
price stays stable and does not decrease any more – or, if it does decrease, it 
does so at a rate that is almost negligible. 
 
 
 
 
 
Logit analysis 
 
Finally a logit analysis of the videogames was also run, which tested if the 
probability of a videogame being sold in a single-homing or multi-homing way was 
influenced by the size of the developer or by the quality.9 In the next two tables 
zero corresponds to single-homing while one corresponds to multi-homing. 
 
In this analysis there are two variables: Developer and Quality. The variable 
Developer represents the size of the firm  which developed the videogame (as a 
proxy of the size it is considered the total revenues each developer firm had in the 
period object of investigation). The variable Quality it is the quality of the 
videogame. As a proxy of the quality of a videogame, it was chosen a weighted 
average of the marks received. It was chosen to run a logit analysis given the 
                                                 
9
 It is worth highlighting that the proxy of the quality of the videogames was provided by the website 
http://www.gamerankings.com/, where the scores of different reviews are collected to give a unique 
mark. Marks are collected from both online and offline sources, collected marks are  weighted by 
different parameters (number of reviews, variety of titles, etc) and consistency among scores are 
tested.  
94 
characteristics of the distributions and given that empirically there are no 
significant differences respect the probit one. 
 
Table 3.11 
Multi-homing choice general analysis 
 General 
Parameters Coeff. P>|z| Std. Err. z 
Developer -1.89e-07   0.000 1.29e-08 -14.64 
Quality -.050266  0.000 0.00377 -13.32 
Constant 5.04392 0.000 0.30096   16.76 
 
Table 3.11. Results of the Logit model for the probability of a videogame being sold 
in single-homing or multi-homing, given its quality and the size of the developer. 
 
 
Table 3.12 
Multi-homing choice by console 
 Wii PS3 XBOX 
Parameters Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| Coeff. P>|z| 
Developer -6.31e-07 0.000 -1.13e-07 0.000 6.46e-06 0.000 
Quality .098864 0.000 -.2503468 0.000 -.1416306 0.000 
Constant -5.4073 0.000 23.38755 0.000 9.583922 0.000 
 
Table 3.12. Results of the Logit model for the probability of a videogame being 
sold in single-homing or multi-homing, given its quality and the size of the 
developer, Here the analysis is differentiated by console (the full results are 
provided in the Appendix). 
 
It is important to describe these results. Firstly it is possible to note that the overall 
probability of a videogame being sold in a single-homing way is increasing in the 
quality of the videogame and in the size of the developer. It should be mentioned 
that given the size of the sample, the results are quite robust (given 4.118 
observation the probability the result is bigger than Chi2 is zero).  
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It is possible to think that console manufacturers are aiming to increase the 
purchasing willingness of the consumers by increasing the perceived difference 
among consoles  and one possible way is to offer exclusive videogame. To 
increase the differentiation, the possibility to play the most successful videogames 
in one console and not in the other is a big advantage. So, firm face a fierce 
competition to have these high valued videogames for their machines and this 
explains why the most valued videogames are sold in single-homing way rather 
than multi-homing' 
 
Moreover, usually to develop good videogames are needed huge resources and 
investments that not so many firms can afford (Chapter one paragraph “The 
videogame market”). This can explain why there is a positive effect between the 
probability for a single-homing videogame to be developed by a big firm. 
 
However, a closer analysis of the results reveals some differentiations among 
consoles and an explanation is required.  
 
Several videogames sold in single-homing were produced by the same big firms 
that produced the consoles or by small firms that did not have enough resources 
to develop the videogame for more than one console. Given this market structure 
the results are quite extreme. This point is crucial.  
 
Moreover the Nintendo results are quite specific. This console was quite 
technologically different from the other two. The power of the console was low 
compared to that of the others present in the market and it was also characterised 
by a different way of playing videogames. The system required the player not to 
use joysticks, where one has to push buttons, but to play a videogame by moving 
a little remote control. Since only the Nintendo console uses this system and since 
it was difficult to use this gaming system with other videogames, it is possible to 
note that more single-homing videogames existed for this console. Moreover, 
Nintendo needed to increase the variety of the offer. This occurrence forced the 
manufacturer to produce different videogames by itself. This also affected the 
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quality, since it was important to have a lot of videogames in stock, though all of 
them were not blockbusters. 
 
Conclusions 
 
These different patterns clearly show that there is an actual difference between 
videogames sold in multi-homing and videogames sold in single-homing. The 
author’s original curiosity led to an exploration of the evolution of prices in a given 
interval of time, which eventually resulted in results showing that there are 
significant differences in the pricing strategies between single-homing and multi-
homing videogames.  
 
The dataset was useful in answering some of the questions that were originally 
asked. The most important one is whether there is a difference in the pricing of 
videogames sold in a single-homing way and in a multi-homing way. What was 
really interesting was that these results were confirmed for all the three console 
markets that were analysed and for the three different websites that were used to 
build the database. 
 
This work tried to explain how it is possible that two different strategies coexist at 
the same time in the same market. However, this fact brings us to another 
question: is this situation a stable one or it is going to change? Since the necessity 
to single-home is necessary to differentiate consoles among themselves and the 
data were collected at the early stages of this generation of consoles, it is possible 
that the proportion among single-homing and multi-homing videogame is going to 
change? 
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Conclusions 
 
At present, two-sided markets are being investigated by different economists and 
a number of relevant papers have been published. This work has tried to improve 
this field of research by investigating how a market would behave under different 
assumptions. 
 
The aim of this work was to explore what would happen in a two-sided market 
where there is an asymmetry between the two sides and the utility of consumers is 
not constant. All these questions were inspired by the Armstrong paper about this 
topic that was published in 200610. After reading that paper, some questions arose. 
First of all, in the real world the utility of consumers, most of the time, is not 
constant. Each of us has to maximise our choices and deal with constraints every 
day. Moreover, as customers we know that in two-sided markets we are in a 
different position in respect to firms on the other side. 
 
To investigate how the market would behave under these assumptions a model 
was developed. The different stages of the model in this work were created to 
investigate little by little these questions. The study illustrated what the main 
dynamics are in markets characterised by perfect competition in the software 
market but with only one platform, two-sided markets characterised by single-
homing and two-sided market characterised by multi-homing. It is important to 
note that there is an actual difference between the founded equilibrium and that in 
the real world.  
 
The results are consistent with the related literature. A two-sided market 
characterised by multi-homing increases the utility of the side that does not multi-
home. This result was intuited at the beginning of this work and it was proved 
equilibrium after equilibrium.  
                                                 
10
 Mark Armstrong (2006) “Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, RAND Journal of Economics , Vol. 
37, No 3, Autumn 2006, pp 668-691. 
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However, the author also wanted to explore the characteristics of the pricing of 
videogames in the real world from a dynamic point of view. The database 
collection was a time-consuming work that took several months of patient and 
constant dedication, but it turned out to be crucial. Thanks to the dataset statistical 
analysis, the author found that in the real world there are differences in quality and 
in the evolution of the price between goods that are sold in multi-homing and those 
that are sold in single-homing. The results clearly showed differences in paths 
between single-homing videogames and multi-homing videogames. More 
precisely, the paths show that the prices of single-homing videogames are more 
stable over time. Moreover, the analysis also showed that there is a difference in 
the quality of single homing-videogames and multi-homing ones. 
 
All this analysis showed that, as the theory predicted, two similar goods will exhibit 
different patterns if they are sold in different market contests. The theoretical part 
of the analysis showed that, when starting with different assumptions, the results 
of other authors are confirmed. The welfare of the side of the market that does not 
multi-home will be high in respect to the welfare that is possible for consumers in 
the single-homing contest. The dataset analysis also confirmed that in the real 
world there is a difference in the quality and price of goods sold in single-homing 
and in multi-homing.   
 
Moreover, the analysis also showed differences in the pricing strategies of the 
online stores that were consulted to fill the database. It is possible, judging from 
the graphs present in the third appendix, that the prices are not the same. Some 
websites have more stable prices while others are characterised by a higher 
variance in prices of the same goods. Also for this reason, in the regressions that 
are presented, the values referred to are the prices charged by the different 
sellers. The differences in these patterns were consistent with Varian (1980) and 
Baye-Morgan (2004) and can be the object of further investigations. 
 
However, as sometimes happens, new findings brought up new questions. First of 
all, it has to be mentioned that the fact that there are two different strategies in the 
100 
same market is quite curious. Since there are differences in the evolution of the 
price and in the quality of videogames, is this differentiation going to persist in the 
long run? 
 
Another possible question derives from the fact that the model that was developed 
was a static one, while the dataset described the evolution of prices over a long 
period of time. If the model included time and different generations of consoles, 
changing after a certain period of time maybe the behaviour of the different agents 
in the market would have been different. 
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A p p e n d i x  1  
 
Part 1 
 
In this first part of the appendix is reported what the author did to evaluate the 
number of the consumer in the market. First of all it is possible to start reminding 
what it is known such as the formula of the number of consumers, the parameter 
θ, and the number of videogames that are bought:  
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It is possible now to make some simplification among the terms containing α and β 
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If we regroup the terms containing the prices of the software and we sum the 
common terms 
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We can work on the signs and multiply the denominators and the denominators of 
the central terms by 2 
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Summing all the terms containing the prices of the software, the result will bring to: 
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We can simplify the two squared α 
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Working on the first two terms  
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It is possible to rearrange the terms in this way 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally in a more elegant way 
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Part 2 
 
In this second part of the appendix will be derived the price of the software of 
model four. First it is possible to start by focusing on the optimal price of the 
software; as before the starting equation is the profit of the platform producer one 
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Now to find the when the profits are maximized by charging the optimal price of 
the software, we have to derive the profit function of the platform producer by the 
price of the software: 
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So by differentiating we will find  
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We can assume also at this point that the equilibrium is symmetric for both 
platforms and so we can simplify and consider that the prices of both platforms 
and software are equal. The result will be: 
 
 
112 
( ) 0
2222
1
28
22
=+




 −
+−+





−
−
+




 −−
ββ
α
ββ
α
β
α ssAsA
psA
sA
pA
sA cppncp
p
p
t
p
n
 
 
In the second square brackets, it is possible to sum the two terms containing the 
price of the software: 
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However we can remember that when we maximized the profits of the platform we 
found the optimal price of the platform which was equal to  
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We can now substitute the value of the optimal price of the platform into the 
optimal price of the software equation and have: 
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Some simplifications are possible and the solution will be:  
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It is also possible to simplify the cost of the platform present in the first square 
brackets 
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Finally, we can see that now also the t term can be simplified  
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Since β is a parameter, it is possible to multiply everything by 2β 
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Now we can observe that the parameter α is simplifying and that the price of the 
software can be easily evaluated  
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By summing the price of the software, bringing the cost of the software on the right 
side and changing the signs 
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It is important to highlight the fact that in the optimal prices of the software, the 
royalties are equal to zero. Given this result, it appears that platform producers 
earn just form the hardware side.  
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A p p e n d i x  2  
 
 
In this part is reported what has been done using 
the statistical software “Stata”. 
 
First the database was browsed in the software.  
 
Note: multi-homing is characterised by dummy 
equal to 1 single homing is characterised by 
dummy equal to 0 
 
After that the, time is set with the following 
command, however it has to be set also the panel 
variable. In the case of the database in object 
the time variable is T and represent the week the 
videogame was sold since lunch. Y instead 
represents the videogame which is analysed. Since 
prices were collected from different websites, 
the following variables were adopted: 
 
p a  :  p r i c e  f o r m  “ A m a z o n ”  
p g p :  p r i c e  f o r m  “ G a m e  P l a y ”  
p g  :  p r i c e  f r o m  “ G a m e ”  
p   :  i s  t h e  m e a n  o f  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  w e b s i t e s  
y   :  i s  t h e  v i d e o g a m e  
c   :  c o n s o l e  ( 1 = W i i ,  2 =  P S 3 ,  3 =  X b o x )  
d u m m y  ( 0 =  s i n g l e - h o m i n g ,  1 =  m u l t i - h o m i n g )  
 
 
.  x t s e t  y   t  
       p a n e l  v a r i a b l e :   y  ( u n b a l a n c e d )  
        t i m e  v a r i a b l e :   t ,  1  t o  1 3 2  
                d e l t a :   1  u n i t  
 
S o m e  v a r i a b l e s  h a v e  g o t  t o  b e  g e n e r a t e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  m o d e l  t o  b e c o m e  
s q u a r e d  a n d  c u b i c  
.  g e n  t 2 = (  t ^ 2 )  
.  g e n  t 3 = (  t ^ 3 )  
.  g e n  t d = (  t *  d u m m y )  
.  g e n  t 2 d = (  t ^ 2 *  d u m m y )  
.  g e n  t 3 d = (  t ^ 3 *  d u m m y )  
 
 
 
g e n  p w i i = p   i f  c = = 1  
g e n  p p s 3 = p   i f  c = = 2  
g e n  p x b o x = p  i f  c = = 3  
 
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  v a r i a b l e s  
 
.  s u m m a r i z e  p a , d e t a i l  
                             P a  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %          5 . 8 5            1 . 7 5  
 5 %          8 . 5 8               2  
1 0 %          9 . 9 9             2 . 9        O b s                 4 4 4 5  
2 5 %         1 3 . 6 5               3        S u m  o f  W g t .         4 4 4 5  
 
5 0 %         1 7 . 9 9                       M e a n            2 0 . 5 9 0 0 5  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 1 4 3 9 0 6  
7 5 %         2 7 . 9 6           5 6 . 9 5  
9 0 %         3 4 . 8 9           5 6 . 9 5        V a r i a n c e        8 3 . 6 1 1 0 1  
9 5 %         3 7 . 1 8            5 9 . 5        S k e w n e s s        . 6 2 2 9 2 2 7  
9 9 %         4 2 . 4 8           5 9 . 9 9        K u r t o s i s        2 . 7 6 4 6 3 5  
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.  s u m m a r i z e   p g p , d e t a i l  
                             P g p  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %          7 . 9 8            4 . 9 8  
 5 %          9 . 9 9            4 . 9 8  
1 0 %         1 2 . 9 9            4 . 9 8        O b s                 3 3 5 2  
2 5 %         1 6 . 9 9            4 . 9 8        S u m  o f  W g t .         3 3 5 2  
 
5 0 %         2 4 . 9 9                       M e a n            2 4 . 0 5 0 3 1  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 1 3 9 3 0 2  
7 5 %         2 9 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9  
9 0 %         3 9 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9        V a r i a n c e        8 3 . 5 2 6 8 5  
9 5 %         3 9 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9        S k e w n e s s        . 2 0 8 9 3 5 7  
9 9 %         3 9 . 9 9           4 4 . 9 9        K u r t o s i s        2 . 0 8 5 0 0 7  
 
 
 
 
.  s u m m a r i z e    p g , d e t a i l  
                             P g  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %          6 . 9 8            4 . 9 8  
 5 %          9 . 9 8            4 . 9 8  
1 0 %          9 . 9 9            4 . 9 8        O b s                 4 5 8 6  
2 5 %         1 4 . 9 8            4 . 9 8        S u m  o f  W g t .         4 5 8 6  
 
5 0 %         1 9 . 5 6                       M e a n            2 1 . 3 7 4 9 5  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 3 3 2 0 8 3  
7 5 %         2 9 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9  
9 0 %         3 4 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9        V a r i a n c e        8 7 . 0 8 7 7 8  
9 5 %         3 9 . 9 9           3 9 . 9 9        S k e w n e s s           . 5 5 5 4  
9 9 %         3 9 . 9 9           4 2 . 9 9        K u r t o s i s         2 . 3 0 0 3 6  
 
 
 
To analyse the different variables, the following 
commands had been used  
 
 
sum p if dummy==0, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         9.93           7.27 
 5%        12.11           7.98 
10%        13.08           7.98       Obs                1704 
25%        16.14           8.99       Sum of Wgt.        1704 
 
50%       21.315                      Mean           22.68087 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      7.737545 
75%        29.65          39.99 
90%        33.32          39.99       Variance       59.86961 
95%        35.83          39.99       Skewness       .2649257 
99%        38.99          39.99       Kurtosis       1.904812 
 
 
sum p  if dummy==1, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         7.02           1.75 
 5%         8.77           4.99 
10%         9.99           4.99       Obs                2959 
25%        14.24           5.04       Sum of Wgt.        2959 
 
50%        18.79                      Mean           20.46601 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       8.45965 
75%        26.09          42.76 
90%        33.32          42.77       Variance       71.56568 
95%        36.65          44.46       Skewness       .5467875 
99%        39.99          46.99       Kurtosis       2.485945 
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sum p  if c==1, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         8.22           7.24 
 5%         9.99           7.24 
10%        12.03           7.24       Obs                1421 
25%        14.99           7.64       Sum of Wgt.        1421 
 
50%        20.32                      Mean           20.90846 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       7.07408 
75%        26.99          36.65 
90%        29.99          36.65       Variance        50.0426 
95%        30.99          36.65       Skewness       .0730283 
99%        34.15          37.81       Kurtosis       1.847008 
 
 
sum p  if c==2, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         6.94           4.99 
 5%         8.97           5.04 
10%        10.78           5.98       Obs                1798 
25%        14.99           5.99       Sum of Wgt.        1798 
 
50%        19.21                      Mean           21.88246 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       9.10969 
75%        29.99          42.76 
90%        35.66          42.77       Variance       82.98645 
95%        37.29          44.46       Skewness       .4031432 
99%        39.99          46.99       Kurtosis        2.06449 
 
 
sum p if t==4, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        19.99          19.99 
 5%        19.99          37.66 
10%        19.99          38.32       Obs                   3 
25%        19.99              .       Sum of Wgt.           3 
 
50%        37.66                      Mean              31.99 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      10.39754 
75%        38.32              . 
90%        38.32          19.99       Variance       108.1089 
95%        38.32          37.66       Skewness      -.7039029 
99%        38.32          38.32       Kurtosis            1.5 
 
 
 
 
sum p  if  h==0, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%          7.4           1.75 
 5%         9.45           4.99 
10%        11.25           4.99       Obs                4383 
25%        14.97           5.04       Sum of Wgt.        4383 
 
50%        19.56                      Mean           21.31086 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      8.347343 
75%        28.16          42.76 
90%        33.32          42.77       Variance       69.67813 
95%        36.32          44.46       Skewness       .4023392 
99%        39.99          46.99       Kurtosis       2.235982 
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. sum p  if  h==1, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         8.92           8.47 
 5%       12.005           8.47 
10%        13.58           8.92       Obs                 280 
25%        15.62           9.42       Sum of Wgt.         280 
 
50%       18.395                      Mean           20.72007 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.964389 
75%        24.99          37.97 
90%        31.91          37.97       Variance       48.50272 
95%       34.165          38.82       Skewness       .7632655 
99%        37.97          39.42       Kurtosis       2.676189 
 
 
 
sum p if t==4, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        19.99          19.99 
 5%        19.99          37.66 
10%        19.99          38.32       Obs                   3 
25%        19.99              .       Sum of Wgt.           3 
 
50%        37.66                      Mean              31.99 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      10.39754 
75%        38.32              . 
90%        38.32          19.99       Variance       108.1089 
95%        38.32          37.66       Skewness      -.7039029 
99%        38.32          38.32       Kurtosis            1.5 
 
 
sum p if t==8, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        18.65          18.65 
 5%        19.32          19.99 
10%        22.49          24.99       Obs                  20 
25%        26.05          24.99       Sum of Wgt.          20 
 
50%       30.485                      Mean             30.893 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.373947 
75%        35.57          38.99 
90%       39.905          39.82       Variance        40.6272 
95%        39.99          39.99       Skewness      -.1701988 
99%        39.99          39.99       Kurtosis       2.216687 
 
 
sum p if t==16, detail 
 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        14.49          14.49 
 5%        15.65          14.99 
10%        20.83          15.65       Obs                  47 
25%        24.32          20.65       Sum of Wgt.          47 
 
50%        28.15                      Mean            27.9534 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.066661 
75%        33.32          36.65 
90%        36.31          36.65       Variance       36.80437 
95%        36.65          36.82       Skewness      -.2493437 
99%        37.95          37.95       Kurtosis       2.411045 
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sum p if t==32, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        12.69          12.69 
 5%        14.32          13.32 
10%        14.99          13.51       Obs                  63 
25%        17.24          14.32       Sum of Wgt.          63 
 
50%        23.72                      Mean           25.24794 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      8.066933 
75%        33.32          37.37 
90%        36.32          39.14       Variance        65.0754 
95%        37.37          39.15       Skewness       .1898485 
99%        39.99          39.99       Kurtosis       1.762723 
 
 
sum p if t==64, detail 
                              P 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         7.02           7.02 
 5%         8.84           8.67 
10%         9.46           8.75       Obs                  67 
25%        12.18           8.84       Sum of Wgt.          67 
 
50%        16.46                      Mean            17.6894 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      7.228454 
75%        21.32          30.66 
90%        29.97          33.32       Variance       52.25054 
95%        30.66          33.32       Skewness       .7828563 
99%        35.11          35.11       Kurtosis       2.639779 
 
 
 
 
s u m  p  i f  t = = 7 4 ,  d e t a i l  
                              P  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %          7 . 2 4            7 . 2 4  
 5 %          8 . 1 6            7 . 6 9  
1 0 %          8 . 7 2            7 . 9 8        O b s                   6 1  
2 5 %         1 0 . 6 2            8 . 1 6        S u m  o f  W g t .           6 1  
 
5 0 %         1 3 . 9 9                       M e a n            1 5 . 3 3 0 4 9  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       6 . 0 1 2 3 5 8  
7 5 %         1 7 . 9 9           2 8 . 9 9  
9 0 %         2 4 . 9 9           2 9 . 6 6        V a r i a n c e        3 6 . 1 4 8 4 5  
9 5 %         2 8 . 9 9           2 9 . 9 9        S k e w n e s s        1 . 0 5 2 8 3 1  
9 9 %         3 0 . 9 9           3 0 . 9 9        K u r t o s i s        3 . 5 3 8 5 3 1  
 
 
 
 
.  s u m  a v  i f   c = = 1 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %            5 7              5 7  
 5 %            5 7              5 7  
1 0 %         6 1 . 3 3              5 7        O b s                 1 3 5 4  
2 5 %         6 5 . 7 2              5 7        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 3 5 4  
 
5 0 %         6 9 . 7 1                       M e a n              7 2 . 0 0 1  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 3 0 7 4 0 7  
7 5 %         7 6 . 9 5           9 7 . 4 6  
9 0 %         8 3 . 2 6           9 7 . 4 6        V a r i a n c e        8 6 . 6 2 7 8 2  
9 5 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        S k e w n e s s        . 9 5 8 3 1 5 4  
9 9 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        K u r t o s i s        3 . 7 2 3 7 9 4  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f   c = = 2 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         5 0 . 1 5           5 0 . 1 5  
 5 %         5 6 . 2 7           5 0 . 1 5  
1 0 %         6 3 . 9 6           5 0 . 1 5        O b s                 1 3 9 6  
2 5 %         6 8 . 9 7           5 0 . 1 5        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 3 9 6  
 
5 0 %         7 8 . 8 2                       M e a n            7 6 . 7 3 3 2 1  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       1 1 . 0 9 0 2 8  
7 5 %         8 4 . 3 9           9 3 . 5 6  
9 0 %         8 7 . 9 3           9 3 . 5 6        V a r i a n c e        1 2 2 . 9 9 4 3  
9 5 %         9 3 . 5 4           9 3 . 5 6        S k e w n e s s       - . 6 7 2 0 4 0 7  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        K u r t o s i s        2 . 8 8 4 4 1 2  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f   c = = 3 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         5 3 . 2 6           5 3 . 2 6  
 5 %         5 8 . 8 8           5 3 . 2 6  
1 0 %         6 5 . 6 7           5 3 . 2 6        O b s                 1 7 8 0  
2 5 %         7 2 . 8 2           5 3 . 2 6        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 7 8 0  
 
5 0 %          8 0 . 4                       M e a n            7 8 . 3 1 3 7 3  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 5 4 5 4 9 6  
7 5 %        8 4 . 7 3 5           9 3 . 5 3  
9 0 %         8 9 . 8 5           9 3 . 5 3        V a r i a n c e        9 1 . 1 1 6 4 9  
9 5 %         9 3 . 3 2           9 3 . 5 3        S k e w n e s s       - . 6 9 8 4 1 4 1  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 3           9 3 . 5 3        K u r t o s i s        3 . 2 7 2 6 9 5  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f    i n h o u s e = = 0 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         6 3 . 0 4           6 3 . 0 4  
 5 %         6 3 . 0 4           6 3 . 0 4  
1 0 %         7 6 . 9 5           6 3 . 0 4        O b s                  6 9 5  
2 5 %         7 9 . 7 9           6 3 . 0 4        S u m  o f  W g t .          6 9 5  
 
5 0 %         8 6 . 5 1                       M e a n            8 4 . 9 8 1 6 5  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 3 7 5 7 7 7  
7 5 %         9 3 . 3 2           9 7 . 4 6  
9 0 %         9 3 . 5 3           9 7 . 4 6        V a r i a n c e         8 7 . 9 0 5 2  
9 5 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        S k e w n e s s       - . 9 6 2 7 1 3 8  
9 9 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        K u r t o s i s        3 . 4 7 7 8 6 3  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f    i n h o u s e = = 1 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         5 0 . 1 5           5 0 . 1 5  
 5 %         5 6 . 2 7           5 0 . 1 5  
1 0 %         6 1 . 3 3           5 0 . 1 5        O b s                 3 7 6 8  
2 5 %         6 7 . 7 2           5 0 . 1 5        S u m  o f  W g t .         3 7 6 8  
 
5 0 %         7 3 . 8 7                       M e a n            7 4 . 1 6 8 2 2  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 6 5 0 9 2 7  
7 5 %         8 2 . 5 1           9 3 . 5 6  
9 0 %         8 5 . 6 9           9 3 . 5 6        V a r i a n c e        9 3 . 1 4 0 3 9  
9 5 %          8 8 . 3           9 3 . 5 6        S k e w n e s s        - . 2 7 7 6 4 5  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        K u r t o s i s        2 . 6 5 9 3 3 4  
 
.  
s u m  a v  i f     d u m m y = = 0 ,  d e t a i l   F o r  c o n s o l e  W i i  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         6 1 . 3 3           6 1 . 3 3  
 5 %         6 1 . 3 3           6 1 . 3 3  
1 0 %         6 3 . 0 4           6 1 . 3 3        O b s                  8 0 2  
2 5 %         6 5 . 3 7           6 1 . 3 3        S u m  o f  W g t .          8 0 2  
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5 0 %         6 7 . 7 2                       M e a n            7 2 . 3 2 9 4 8  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       1 0 . 1 1 1 1 1  
7 5 %         7 6 . 9 5           9 7 . 4 6  
9 0 %         8 2 . 4 8           9 7 . 4 6        V a r i a n c e        1 0 2 . 2 3 4 6  
9 5 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        S k e w n e s s        1 . 2 2 3 2 9 7  
9 9 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        K u r t o s i s        3 . 6 7 2 0 8 1  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f     d u m m y = = 1 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %            5 7              5 7  
 5 %            5 7              5 7  
1 0 %            5 7              5 7        O b s                  5 5 2  
2 5 %        6 8 . 2 5 5              5 7        S u m  o f  W g t .          5 5 2  
 
5 0 %         7 0 . 4 8                       M e a n            7 1 . 5 2 3 7 5  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       7 . 9 8 1 9 7 2  
7 5 %         7 7 . 2 3           8 3 . 2 6  
9 0 %         8 3 . 2 6           8 3 . 2 6        V a r i a n c e        6 3 . 7 1 1 8 7  
9 5 %         8 3 . 2 6           8 3 . 2 6        S k e w n e s s        . 0 0 8 4 9 0 8  
9 9 %         8 3 . 2 6           8 3 . 2 6        K u r t o s i s        2 . 5 3 0 9 5 8  
 
.  s u m  a v ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %            5 7              5 7  
 5 %            5 7              5 7  
1 0 %         6 1 . 3 3              5 7        O b s                 1 3 5 4  
2 5 %         6 5 . 7 2              5 7        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 3 5 4  
 
5 0 %         6 9 . 7 1                       M e a n              7 2 . 0 0 1  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       9 . 3 0 7 4 0 7  
7 5 %         7 6 . 9 5           9 7 . 4 6  
9 0 %         8 3 . 2 6           9 7 . 4 6        V a r i a n c e        8 6 . 6 2 7 8 2  
9 5 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        S k e w n e s s        . 9 5 8 3 1 5 4  
9 9 %         9 7 . 4 6           9 7 . 4 6        K u r t o s i s        3 . 7 2 3 7 9 4  
 
 
 
.  s u m  a v  i f     d u m m y = = 0 ,  d e t a i l  F o r  c o n s o l e  P l a y s t a t i o n  3  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         8 4 . 3 9           8 4 . 3 9  
 5 %         8 4 . 3 9           8 4 . 3 9  
1 0 %         8 4 . 3 9           8 4 . 3 9        O b s                  1 9 0  
2 5 %         8 4 . 3 9           8 4 . 3 9        S u m  o f  W g t .          1 9 0  
 
5 0 %         8 6 . 2 3                       M e a n            8 7 . 7 4 1 5 8  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       3 . 8 5 0 0 5 1  
7 5 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6  
9 0 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        V a r i a n c e        1 4 . 8 2 2 8 9  
9 5 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        S k e w n e s s        . 7 6 9 3 9 4 8  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        K u r t o s i s        1 . 7 6 6 8 4 7  
 
.  s u m  a v  i f     d u m m y = = 1 ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         5 0 . 1 5           5 0 . 1 5  
 5 %         5 0 . 1 5           5 0 . 1 5  
1 0 %         5 6 . 2 7           5 0 . 1 5        O b s                 1 2 0 6  
2 5 %         6 8 . 4 5           5 0 . 1 5        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 2 0 6  
 
5 0 %        7 6 . 5 5 5                       M e a n            7 4 . 9 9 8 8 9  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       1 0 . 8 6 0 2 2  
7 5 %          8 2 . 9           9 3 . 5 4  
9 0 %         8 7 . 9 3           9 3 . 5 4        V a r i a n c e        1 1 7 . 9 4 4 5  
9 5 %         9 3 . 5 4           9 3 . 5 4        S k e w n e s s       - . 5 7 4 8 0 6 8  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 4           9 3 . 5 4        K u r t o s i s        2 . 7 9 6 2 3 3  
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.  s u m  a v  ,  d e t a i l  
 
                             A v  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
      P e r c e n t i l e s       S m a l l e s t  
 1 %         5 0 . 1 5           5 0 . 1 5  
 5 %         5 6 . 2 7           5 0 . 1 5  
1 0 %         6 3 . 9 6           5 0 . 1 5        O b s                 1 3 9 6  
2 5 %         6 8 . 9 7           5 0 . 1 5        S u m  o f  W g t .         1 3 9 6  
 
5 0 %         7 8 . 8 2                       M e a n            7 6 . 7 3 3 2 1  
                        L a r g e s t        S t d .  D e v .       1 1 . 0 9 0 2 8  
7 5 %         8 4 . 3 9           9 3 . 5 6  
9 0 %         8 7 . 9 3           9 3 . 5 6        V a r i a n c e        1 2 2 . 9 9 4 3  
9 5 %         9 3 . 5 4           9 3 . 5 6        S k e w n e s s       - . 6 7 2 0 4 0 7  
9 9 %         9 3 . 5 6           9 3 . 5 6        K u r t o s i s        2 . 8 8 4 4 1 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
After the generation of the previous variables, 
different models are tested 
 
 
 
 
x t r e g    p a  t   t d  t 2  t 2 d  t 3  t 3 d  d u m m y  
 
R a n d o m - e f f e c t s  G L S  r e g r e s s i o n                    N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =       4 4 4 5  
G r o u p  v a r i a b l e :  y                                N u m b e r  o f  g r o u p s    =         7 0  
 
R - s q :   w i t h i n   =  0 . 3 5 4 8                          O b s  p e r  g r o u p :  m i n  =         3 4  
       b e t w e e n  =  0 . 0 2 7 0                                         a v g  =       6 3 . 5  
       o v e r a l l  =  0 . 2 0 5 1                                         m a x  =         6 9  
 
R a n d o m  e f f e c t s  u _ i  ~  G a u s s i a n                    W a l d  c h i 2 ( 7 )        =    2 3 9 6 . 9 1  
c o r r ( u _ i ,  X )        =  0  ( a s s u m e d )                 P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
          p a  |       C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
           t  |   - . 2 9 8 2 2 5 3    . 0 5 2 6 7 7 7     - 5 . 6 6    0 . 0 0 0     - . 4 0 1 4 7 1 8    - . 1 9 4 9 7 8 9  
          t d  |   - . 4 3 6 6 0 3 2    . 0 8 7 1 2 5 7     - 5 . 0 1    0 . 0 0 0     - . 6 0 7 3 6 6 5      - . 2 6 5 8 4  
          t 2  |    . 0 0 2 0 6 3 1    . 0 0 0 9 4 1 5      2 . 1 9    0 . 0 2 8      . 0 0 0 2 1 7 8     . 0 0 3 9 0 8 3  
         t 2 d  |    . 0 0 5 1 8 7 9    . 0 0 1 7 4 9 4      2 . 9 7    0 . 0 0 3      . 0 0 1 7 5 9 1     . 0 0 8 6 1 6 7  
          t 3  |   - 5 . 1 2 e - 0 6    4 . 9 1 e - 0 6     - 1 . 0 4    0 . 2 9 6     - . 0 0 0 0 1 4 7     4 . 4 9 e - 0 6  
         t 3 d  |   - . 0 0 0 0 2 1 7    . 0 0 0 0 1 0 7     - 2 . 0 3    0 . 0 4 3     - . 0 0 0 0 4 2 7    - 7 . 1 4 e - 0 7  
       d u m m y  |    7 . 8 0 7 6 5 6    1 . 9 0 5 2 8 1      4 . 1 0    0 . 0 0 0      4 . 0 7 3 3 7 4     1 1 . 5 4 1 9 4  
       _ c o n s  |    3 2 . 2 1 5 1 6    1 . 4 0 0 7 0 3     2 3 . 0 0    0 . 0 0 0      2 9 . 4 6 9 8 3     3 4 . 9 6 0 4 9  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
     s i g m a _ u  |   5 . 6 6 0 7 2 7 8  
     s i g m a _ e  |   5 . 8 6 6 0 7 0 1  
         r h o  |   . 4 8 2 1 9 1 3 1    ( f r a c t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  d u e  t o  u _ i )  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
 
x t r e g     p g p  t   t d  t 2  t 2 d  t 3  t 3 d  d u m m y  
 
R a n d o m - e f f e c t s  G L S  r e g r e s s i o n                    N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =       3 3 5 2  
G r o u p  v a r i a b l e :  y                                N u m b e r  o f  g r o u p s    =         7 0  
 
R - s q :   w i t h i n   =  0 . 4 1 9 3                          O b s  p e r  g r o u p :  m i n  =         1 5  
       b e t w e e n  =  0 . 0 0 0 0                                         a v g  =       4 7 . 9  
       o v e r a l l  =  0 . 1 4 4 5                                         m a x  =         6 9  
 
R a n d o m  e f f e c t s  u _ i  ~  G a u s s i a n                    W a l d  c h i 2 ( 7 )        =    2 3 3 0 . 7 3  
c o r r ( u _ i ,  X )        =  0  ( a s s u m e d )                 P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
         p g p  |       C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
           t  |   - . 0 9 3 4 4 4 6    . 0 5 3 5 9 5 9     - 1 . 7 4    0 . 0 8 1     - . 1 9 8 4 9 0 5     . 0 1 1 6 0 1 4  
          t d  |    - . 2 6 4 8 6 6    . 0 9 0 0 3 7 6     - 2 . 9 4    0 . 0 0 3     - . 4 4 1 3 3 6 4    - . 0 8 8 3 9 5 6  
          t 2  |   - . 0 0 3 2 4 6 6    . 0 0 0 9 9 8 3     - 3 . 2 5    0 . 0 0 1     - . 0 0 5 2 0 3 2    - . 0 0 1 2 9 0 1  
         t 2 d  |    . 0 0 4 4 5 1 3    . 0 0 1 9 4 4 7      2 . 2 9    0 . 0 2 2      . 0 0 0 6 3 9 8     . 0 0 8 2 6 2 8  
          t 3  |    . 0 0 0 0 2 3 8    5 . 4 0 e - 0 6      4 . 4 0    0 . 0 0 0      . 0 0 0 0 1 3 2     . 0 0 0 0 3 4 4  
         t 3 d  |   - . 0 0 0 0 2 6 7    . 0 0 0 0 1 2 9     - 2 . 0 8    0 . 0 3 8     - . 0 0 0 0 5 1 9    - 1 . 5 1 e - 0 6  
       d u m m y  |    3 . 4 8 8 7 2 1    1 . 9 6 1 8 7 3      1 . 7 8    0 . 0 7 5     - . 3 5 6 4 7 9 8     7 . 3 3 3 9 2 2  
       _ c o n s  |    3 2 . 6 2 8 8 2    1 . 4 5 8 5 2 7     2 2 . 3 7    0 . 0 0 0      2 9 . 7 7 0 1 6     3 5 . 4 8 7 4 8  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
     s i g m a _ u  |   6 . 1 1 5 3 9 4 2  
     s i g m a _ e  |   5 . 0 5 5 3 6 2 9  
         r h o  |   . 5 9 4 0 4 6 5 5    ( f r a c t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  d u e  t o  u _ i )  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
 
x t r e g      p g  t   t d  t 2  t 2 d  t 3  t 3 d  d u m m y  
 
R a n d o m - e f f e c t s  G L S  r e g r e s s i o n                    N u m b e r  o f  o b s       =       4 5 8 6  
G r o u p  v a r i a b l e :  y                                N u m b e r  o f  g r o u p s    =         7 0  
 
R - s q :   w i t h i n   =  0 . 5 2 8 8                          O b s  p e r  g r o u p :  m i n  =         5 4  
       b e t w e e n  =  0 . 0 0 0 2                                         a v g  =       6 5 . 5  
       o v e r a l l  =  0 . 2 3 7 0                                         m a x  =         6 8  
 
R a n d o m  e f f e c t s  u _ i  ~  G a u s s i a n                    W a l d  c h i 2 ( 7 )        =    5 0 1 9 . 4 4  
c o r r ( u _ i ,  X )        =  0  ( a s s u m e d )                 P r o b  >  c h i 2         =     0 . 0 0 0 0  
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
          p g  |       C o e f .    S t d .  E r r .       z     P > | z |      [ 9 5 %  C o n f .  I n t e r v a l ]  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
           t  |   - . 3 2 9 9 5 1 5    . 0 4 6 0 1 5 3     - 7 . 1 7    0 . 0 0 0     - . 4 2 0 1 3 9 8    - . 2 3 9 7 6 3 2  
          t d  |   - . 2 9 5 7 0 6 8    . 0 7 4 6 9 5 2     - 3 . 9 6    0 . 0 0 0     - . 4 4 2 1 0 6 7    - . 1 4 9 3 0 6 9  
          t 2  |    . 0 0 0 8 2 0 2    . 0 0 0 8 2 1 5      1 . 0 0    0 . 3 1 8     - . 0 0 0 7 8 9 9     . 0 0 2 4 3 0 2  
         t 2 d  |    . 0 0 4 2 3 3 4    . 0 0 1 5 0 1 6      2 . 8 2    0 . 0 0 5      . 0 0 1 2 9 0 3     . 0 0 7 1 7 6 6  
          t 3  |    3 . 9 7 e - 0 6    4 . 2 8 e - 0 6      0 . 9 3    0 . 3 5 5     - 4 . 4 3 e - 0 6     . 0 0 0 0 1 2 4  
         t 3 d  |   - . 0 0 0 0 2 5 2    9 . 2 2 e - 0 6     - 2 . 7 3    0 . 0 0 6     - . 0 0 0 0 4 3 2    - 7 . 1 0 e - 0 6  
       d u m m y  |    4 . 3 3 7 0 5 2    1 . 8 2 8 7 8 2      2 . 3 7    0 . 0 1 8      . 7 5 2 7 0 5 4     7 . 9 2 1 3 9 9  
       _ c o n s  |    3 6 . 1 7 5 3 8    1 . 3 7 4 5 8 1     2 6 . 3 2    0 . 0 0 0      3 3 . 4 8 1 2 5     3 8 . 8 6 9 5 1  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
     s i g m a _ u  |   5 . 8 6 8 3 2 1 9  
     s i g m a _ e  |   5 . 0 9 3 0 3 7 1  
         r h o  |   . 5 7 0 3 7 6 8 2    ( f r a c t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  d u e  t o  u _ i )  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
. 
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It is possible to run the same calculation but focusing on the prices charged by consoles. In 
the next analysis the regressions are done on the different console’s videogame to try to 
highlight the main dynamics 
 
First of all the Wii market is studied 
 
 
  
xtreg      p t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1421 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5264                         Obs per group: min =        56 
       between = 0.0790                                        avg =      67.7 
       overall = 0.0988                                        max =        69 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   1532.18 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        pwii |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.2367041   .0448333    -5.28   0.000    -.3245757   -.1488325 
          td |  -.7548172   .0972249    -7.76   0.000    -.9453744     -.56426 
          t2 |   .0006046   .0007739     0.78   0.435    -.0009122    .0021213 
         t2d |   .0138427   .0019469     7.11   0.000     .0100269    .0176586 
          t3 |   2.32e-06   3.82e-06     0.61   0.545    -5.18e-06    9.81e-06 
         t3d |  -.0000813   .0000118    -6.90   0.000    -.0001044   -.0000582 
       dummy |   11.06089    2.88344     3.84   0.000      5.40945    16.71233 
       _cons |   31.39432    1.71043    18.35   0.000     28.04194    34.74671 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.5499269 
     sigma_e |  3.5398102 
         rho |  .71083097   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
xtreg        pa  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1367 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3133                         Obs per group: min =        53 
       between = 0.0001                                        avg =      65.1 
       overall = 0.1105                                        max =        69 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    610.38 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.2366092    .061119    -3.87   0.000    -.3564003   -.1168181 
          td |  -.3087638   .1335291    -2.31   0.021    -.5704761   -.0470516 
          t2 |   .0009317   .0010539     0.88   0.377    -.0011339    .0029973 
         t2d |   .0022862   .0026811     0.85   0.394    -.0029686     .007541 
          t3 |   1.02e-06   5.20e-06     0.20   0.845    -9.18e-06    .0000112 
         t3d |   5.26e-06   .0000163     0.32   0.746    -.0000266    .0000371 
       dummy |   7.233925   3.586235     2.02   0.044     .2050344    14.26282 
       _cons |   30.24866   2.104945    14.37   0.000     26.12304    34.37427 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  6.6743111 
     sigma_e |  4.8037357 
         rho |  .65875348   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg         pgp  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1022 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4425                         Obs per group: min =        15 
       between = 0.1913                                        avg =      48.7 
       overall = 0.0262                                        max =        69 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    750.16 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         pgp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.0990561   .0628777    -1.58   0.115    -.2222943     .024182 
          td |  -1.128492    .156646    -7.20   0.000    -1.435512   -.8214713 
          t2 |  -.0018672   .0010996    -1.70   0.089    -.0040224     .000288 
         t2d |   .0228761   .0036663     6.24   0.000     .0156903     .030062 
          t3 |   .0000152   5.59e-06     2.72   0.007     4.25e-06    .0000261 
         t3d |  -.0001484   .0000264    -5.63   0.000    -.0002001   -.0000968 
       dummy |   15.42178   2.937883     5.25   0.000      9.66364    21.17993 
       _cons |   29.44359   1.647865    17.87   0.000     26.21384    32.67335 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   4.702276 
     sigma_e |  4.0426134 
         rho |  .57500725   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
xtreg           pg t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1397 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4684                         Obs per group: min =        55 
       between = 0.1054                                        avg =      66.5 
       overall = 0.0848                                        max =        68 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   1173.52 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.3551032    .061212    -5.80   0.000    -.4750765   -.2351299 
          td |  -1.056992    .132177    -8.00   0.000    -1.316054   -.7979297 
          t2 |    .002363   .0010585     2.23   0.026     .0002883    .0044377 
         t2d |   .0216342    .002651     8.16   0.000     .0164383    .0268302 
          t3 |  -5.84e-06   5.24e-06    -1.11   0.265    -.0000161    4.43e-06 
         t3d |  -.0001415   .0000161    -8.81   0.000     -.000173     -.00011 
       dummy |   13.52406   3.117804     4.34   0.000     7.413272    19.63484 
       _cons |   33.93092   1.807209    18.78   0.000     30.38886    37.47299 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.3729092 
     sigma_e |  4.7723489 
         rho |  .55898944   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
sum av if    dummy==0, detail  For console Xbox 
 
                             Av 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        72.82          72.82 
 5%        72.82          72.82 
10%        72.82          72.82       Obs                 579 
25%        79.79          72.82       Sum of Wgt.         579 
 
50%        86.51                      Mean           84.50732 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.937552 
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75%        89.85          93.53 
90%        93.53          93.53       Variance       48.12963 
95%        93.53          93.53       Skewness      -.2253982 
99%        93.53          93.53       Kurtosis       1.763645 
 
. sum av if    dummy==1, detail 
 
                             Av 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        53.26          53.26 
 5%        53.26          53.26 
10%        58.88          53.26       Obs                1201 
25%        70.25          53.26       Sum of Wgt.        1201 
 
50%        75.88                      Mean           75.32781 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      9.190518 
75%        82.82           88.3 
90%        85.69           88.3       Variance       84.46562 
95%         88.3           88.3       Skewness      -.8069829 
99%         88.3           88.3       Kurtosis       2.955458 
 
. sum av , detail 
 
                             Av 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        53.26          53.26 
 5%        58.88          53.26 
10%        65.67          53.26       Obs                1780 
25%        72.82          53.26       Sum of Wgt.        1780 
 
50%         80.4                      Mean           78.31373 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      9.545496 
75%       84.735          93.53 
90%        89.85          93.53       Variance       91.11649 
95%        93.32          93.53       Skewness      -.6984141 
99%        93.53          93.53       Kurtosis       3.272695 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now it is studied the PS3 Market 
 
 
 
 
xtreg  p  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1798 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        27 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6221                         Obs per group: min =        56 
       between = 0.0047                                        avg =      66.6 
       overall = 0.3438                                        max =        67 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   2898.08 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |   .5167457   .2334558     2.21   0.027     .0591807    .9743106 
          td |  -.8177035   .2436894    -3.36   0.001    -1.295326   -.3400811 
          t2 |  -.0170223   .0060386    -2.82   0.005    -.0288578   -.0051868 
         t2d |   .0145097   .0062308     2.33   0.020     .0022976    .0267217 
          t3 |   .0001203    .000047     2.56   0.011     .0000281    .0002125 
         t3d |  -.0000895   .0000481    -1.86   0.063    -.0001838    4.90e-06 
       dummy |   11.67253   4.222868     2.76   0.006      3.39586     19.9492 
       _cons |   25.37034   3.932267     6.45   0.000     17.66324    33.07744 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  5.8466474 
     sigma_e |  4.5024229 
         rho |  .62773344   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xtreg  pa  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1731 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        27 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4041                         Obs per group: min =        55 
       between = 0.0041                                        avg =      64.1 
       overall = 0.2571                                        max =        67 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   1134.09 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.3664489   .3470209    -1.06   0.291    -1.046597    .3136996 
          td |  -.3991807   .3628137    -1.10   0.271    -1.110283    .3119212 
          t2 |   .0067204   .0089808     0.75   0.454    -.0108817    .0243225 
         t2d |   .0007796   .0092748     0.08   0.933    -.0173986    .0189579 
          t3 |  -.0000537   .0000699    -0.77   0.443    -.0001908    .0000834 
         t3d |   .0000239   .0000716     0.33   0.739    -.0001165    .0001642 
       dummy |   9.931121   4.766221     2.08   0.037     .5894987    19.27274 
       _cons |   31.95614   4.458021     7.17   0.000     23.21858     40.6937 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.3079629 
     sigma_e |  6.6122829 
         rho |  .29798165   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Finally it is analysed the Xbox market  
 
 
 
 
xtreg  p  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1444 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        22 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6192                         Obs per group: min =        56 
       between = 0.1730                                        avg =      65.6 
       overall = 0.3916                                        max =        67 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   2297.59 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           p |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.4086081   .0630669    -6.48   0.000     -.532217   -.2849992 
          td |  -.3885854   .1189593    -3.27   0.001    -.6217413   -.1554295 
          t2 |   .0015057   .0012364     1.22   0.223    -.0009176    .0039291 
         t2d |    .008561   .0024428     3.50   0.000     .0037732    .0133488 
          t3 |   2.64e-06   7.26e-06     0.36   0.716    -.0000116    .0000169 
         t3d |  -.0000597   .0000153    -3.89   0.000    -.0000898   -.0000296 
       dummy |   1.161503   2.737415     0.42   0.671    -4.203732    6.526737 
       _cons |   39.16944   1.891641    20.71   0.000      35.4619    42.87699 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.8445808 
     sigma_e |   3.844125 
         rho |  .61363777   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
xtreg        pa  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1347 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        22 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3411                         Obs per group: min =        34 
       between = 0.2187                                        avg =      61.2 
       overall = 0.2646                                        max =        66 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    685.37 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |   -.597291   .0954842    -6.26   0.000    -.7844366   -.4101453 
          td |  -.4288019   .1824237    -2.35   0.019    -.7863457   -.0712581 
          t2 |   .0076776   .0018897     4.06   0.000      .003974    .0113813 
         t2d |   .0079404   .0037278     2.13   0.033      .000634    .0152468 
          t3 |  -.0000377   .0000111    -3.38   0.001    -.0000595   -.0000159 
         t3d |  -.0000537   .0000233    -2.31   0.021    -.0000993   -8.05e-06 
       dummy |   2.350567   3.403666     0.69   0.490    -4.320495    9.021629 
       _cons |   37.94701   2.171566    17.47   0.000     33.69082     42.2032 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.7786539 
     sigma_e |  5.6267795 
         rho |  .41902997   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
xtreg     pgp  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1039 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        22 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4471                         Obs per group: min =        24 
       between = 0.1318                                        avg =      47.2 
       overall = 0.2732                                        max =        67 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =    818.77 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         pgp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.1120994   .0874418    -1.28   0.200    -.2834822    .0592833 
          td |  -1.095157   .2084841    -5.25   0.000    -1.503779    -.686536 
          t2 |  -.0061305   .0018029    -3.40   0.001     -.009664   -.0025969 
         t2d |   .0292699   .0049458     5.92   0.000     .0195764    .0389634 
          t3 |   .0000457   .0000107     4.28   0.000     .0000248    .0000665 
         t3d |   -.000207   .0000359    -5.77   0.000    -.0002773   -.0001367 
       dummy |   5.327909   4.027964     1.32   0.186    -2.566755    13.22257 
       _cons |   38.84815   2.652279    14.65   0.000     33.64978    44.04652 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   6.936211 
     sigma_e |  4.6293081 
         rho |  .69183166   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
xtreg  pg  t  td t2 t2d t3 t3d dummy 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1420 
Group variable: y                               Number of groups   =        22 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5758                         Obs per group: min =        54 
       between = 0.1312                                        avg =      64.5 
       overall = 0.3764                                        max =        66 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(7)       =   1882.50 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           t |  -.3772535   .0798192    -4.73   0.000    -.5336963   -.2208107 
          td |  -.2052904   .1460701    -1.41   0.160    -.4915825    .0810018 
          t2 |  -.0004671   .0015547    -0.30   0.764    -.0035143      .00258 
         t2d |   .0044089   .0029944     1.47   0.141      -.00146    .0102778 
          t3 |   .0000178   9.08e-06     1.96   0.050     2.47e-08    .0000356 
         t3d |  -.0000298   .0000188    -1.59   0.112    -.0000667    6.98e-06 
       dummy |   .1650997   3.004724     0.05   0.956    -5.724052    6.054251 
       _cons |   39.82527   2.036137    19.56   0.000     35.83451    43.81602 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.8252707 
     sigma_e |  4.6422545 
         rho |  .51932373   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Logit analysis. 
 
In the next part the logit calculus are presented. First the calculations refers to the 
whole dataset, later WII is c1, PS3 is C2 and Xbox is C3. 
 
. logit  dummy av developer 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -2615.117   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2332.7987   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2304.0604   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2303.7362   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2303.7361   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       4118 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     622.76 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2303.7361                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1191 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dummy |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |   -.050266   .0037738   -13.32   0.000    -.0576626   -.0428694 
   developer |  -1.89e-07   1.29e-08   -14.64   0.000    -2.14e-07   -1.63e-07 
       _cons |    5.04392   .3009557    16.76   0.000     4.454058    5.633783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logit  inhouse av 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -1930.302   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1607.5935   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1558.5143   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1557.9789   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -1557.9789   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       4463 
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =     744.65 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1557.9789                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1929 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     inhouse |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |  -.1353677   .0059487   -22.76   0.000     -.147027   -.1237084 
       _cons |   12.52314   .4962387    25.24   0.000     11.55053    13.49575 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  l o g i t   d u m m y  a v  d e v e l o p e r  i f  c = = 1  
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -683.06291   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -490.64755   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -462.73695   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -459.35271   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -459.2485   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -459.24825   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -459.24825   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1009 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     447.63 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
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Log likelihood = -459.24825                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3277 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dummy |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |   .0988641   .0113097     8.74   0.000     .0766975    .1210307 
   developer |  -6.31e-07   6.27e-08   -10.08   0.000    -7.54e-07   -5.09e-07 
       _cons |  -5.407346   .7781176    -6.95   0.000    -6.932429   -3.882264 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logit  dummy av developer if c==2 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -545.30049   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -311.11433   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -293.06469   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -266.63149   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -265.60523   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -265.60235   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -265.60235   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1329 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     559.40 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -265.60235                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5129 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dummy |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |  -.2503468   .0207932   -12.04   0.000    -.2911006    -.209593 
   developer |  -1.13e-07   1.66e-08    -6.84   0.000    -1.46e-07   -8.09e-08 
       _cons |   23.38755    1.83069    12.78   0.000     19.79947    26.97564 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logit  dummy av developer if c==3 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1122.7994   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -576.08802   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -435.78733   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -381.59408   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -374.67801   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -374.5856   
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -374.58556   
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -374.58556   
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       1780 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =    1496.43 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -374.58556                       Pseudo R2       =     0.6664 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dummy |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |  -.1416306   .0111345   -12.72   0.000    -.1634539   -.1198073 
   developer |   6.46e-06   4.60e-07    14.07   0.000     5.56e-06    7.37e-06 
       _cons |   9.583922   .8719854    10.99   0.000     7.874862    11.29298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. logit  dummy av developer 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -2615.117   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2332.7987   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2304.0604   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2303.7362   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2303.7361   
 
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =       4118 
                                                  LR chi2(2)      =     622.76 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2303.7361                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1191 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dummy |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          av |   -.050266   .0037738   -13.32   0.000    -.0576626   -.0428694 
   developer |  -1.89e-07   1.29e-08   -14.64   0.000    -2.14e-07   -1.63e-07 
       _cons |    5.04392   .3009557    16.76   0.000     4.454058    5.633783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Game 25: Dark Sector
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Game 28: Viking
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Game 30: Conflict denied
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Game 33: Assassin's Creed
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Game 35: Sega superstars tennis
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Game 36: Fifa street 3
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Game 37: Unreal tournament
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Game 38: Devil may cry 4
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Game 39: Pro evolution soccer 2008
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Game 40: Euro 2008
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Game 41: Fifa 08
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Game 42: Burnout paradise
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Game 43: Metal gear solid 4
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Game 44: Pro evolution soccer 08
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Game 45: Rainbow six vegas 2
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Game 46: Condemned 2
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Game 47: Dark sector
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Game 48: Viking
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Game 49: Guitar hero 3
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Game 50: Bully 
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Game 51: Halo 3
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Game 52: Assassin's creed 
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Game 54: Ace combat 6
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Xbox multi home
Amazon
Game play
Game
time
pr
ic
e
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
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Game 57: Beautiful katamari
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Game 58: The club
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Game 59: Conflict denied
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Game 60: Lost
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Game 61: Fifa street 3
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Game 62: Project gotham racing 4
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Game 63: Army of two
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Game 64: Lost odyssey
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Game 65: Devil may Cry 4
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Game 66: Sega superstars tennis
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Game 67: Burnout paradise
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Game 68: Fifa 08
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